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In December 2001 a conference entitled “Wittgenstein Research Revis-
ited”, with the aim of “reflecting upon 50 years of work on Wittgenstein
and investigating future perspectives”,1 was arranged in Bergen. The
moment seemed appropriate, since 2001, in addition to marking the 50th
anniversary of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s death, was also the first year of the
new millennium. Another reason for arranging this conference was the
completion of the publication of the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgen-
stein’s Nachlass.2 The bulk of the papers in the present collection derive from
that conference, but we have also included additional papers by authors rep-
resenting some of the most important recent work on Wittgenstein.
This collection is thus not a volume of proceedings, although, as the title
Wittgenstein: the Philosopher and his Works indicates, the themes of the confer-
ence are still present, and in particular one aspect of Wittgenstein scholar-
ship that does not always get due attention: the editing of Wittgenstein’s
writings, with the attendant question of what it means to speak of a “work”
by Wittgenstein. This question is simultaneously a question about the rela-
tion between the philosopher’s Nachlass and the works published in printed
form. Such questions have become increasingly relevant since the comple-
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1. See http://wab.aksis.uib.no/w-konferanse/ (accessed June 1st, 2006).
2. Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition, begun in 1998 and completed in
2000, is a joint publication by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen
and Oxford University Press. It consists of six CD-ROMs. See further
http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_BEE.page (accessed June 1st, 2006).
14 | Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works
tion of the Bergen Electronic Edition, which finally made Wittgenstein’s
Nachlass available to all interested scholars, thus dispelling many myths and
rumours surrounding his manuscripts, but also giving rise to new questions
about the status of this material as a source for his philosophical thought. 
The immediate occasion for the Bergen conference was, as mentioned,
that 50 years had passed since Wittgenstein’s death in Cambridge in 1951.
This also means that Wittgenstein is, at least in one unproblematic sense,
now a part of the history of philosophy (although it can be debated whether
or not he can be assigned a clear place in the history of the academic discip-
line called “philosophy”). It was probably the early (and persistent) miscon-
ception of Wittgenstein as a kind of analytic philosopher that gave rise to a
very ahistorical view of his philosophical work, a view he himself partly
encouraged by displaying an “historical abstinence” or even a kind of “his-
toriophobia” (as Hanjo Glock puts it in his paper on Wittgenstein and his-
tory in the present collection). However, during the past decades we have
developed a far more nuanced and detailed picture of Wittgenstein and his
times and life (e.g. through Toulmin and Janik’s study of Wittgenstein’s
Vienna, and the biographies by McGuinness and Monk).3 This, combined
with increasingly detailed Nachlass-related textual scholarship (e.g. Baker
and Hacker’s analytical commentary and Schulte’s critical-genetic edition of
the Investigations),4 and the discovery of some previously unknown material
(the Koder diaries),5 has made it easier to see Wittgenstein as firmly
anchored in an historical and cultural context. This, of course, in no way
diminishes his philosophical achievement or his status as perhaps the single
most important philosopher of the last century. 
3. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin: Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon and Shuster,
1973); Allan Janik: Wittgenstein’s Vienna Revisited (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Publishers, 2001); Brian McGuinness: Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889–1921
(London: Duckworth, 1988, re-issue OUP, 2005); Ray Monk: Ludwig Wittgenstein:
The Duty of Genius (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990).
4. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker: An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations, Vol. 1–2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980–1988), P.M.S. Hacker. An Analytical
Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 3–4 (Oxford: Blackwell,
1990–1996); Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edi-
tion. Hrsg. von J. Schulte in Zusammenarbeit mit H. Nyman, E. von Savigny und
G.H. von Wright (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 2001).
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The question remains, what does it mean to see Wittgenstein in the con-
text of history? Glock quips in his paper that “many contemporary analytic
philosophers feel that Wittgenstein is history, or at least that he should be”.
Be that as it may, this warrants a short reflection upon what “being part of
history” means as regards Wittgenstein and his work. 
In his “Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben”6 (a piece
of writing most certainly familiar to Wittgenstein), Friedrich Nietzsche says
that history belongs to the living person in three respects: as an active and
striving person, as a person who admires and preserves, and as a person who
suffers and needs emancipation. Correlating to these relationships is a trinity
of forms of history (or rather, attitudes to historicity): the monumental, the
antiquarian, and the critical. However, Nietzsche also distinguishes a negative
aspect of historicity, to the effect that history overburdens a person and
functions as a “life-negating” force.7 Without following Nietzsche further,
let us use his typology in order to characterize various attitudes towards
Wittgenstein and his work:
1. The monumental attitude sees Wittgenstein as exemplary, and his work
as something that can empower the contemporary philosopher. The
exegetical understanding of Wittgenstein’s texts, and the discussions of
how to properly understand his conception of philosophy and his met-
hods can be seen as examples of this attitude. 
2. The antiquarian attitude (note that Nietzsche does not use the word in a
pejorative sense) seeks to emphasize the conservation of the past; exam-
ples in this respect might include the interest in the preservation and
5. MS 183. Published as Ludwig Wittgenstein: Denkbewegungen. Tagebücher 1930–1932,
1936–1937, hrsg. von I. Somavilla (Innsbruck: Haymon-Verlag, 1997). Parallel Ger-
man/English text (“Movements of Thought”) in J.C. Klagge and A. Nordmann (eds.):
Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
2003) pp. 3–255.
6. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen II, in Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe
in 15 Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), Vol. 1,
pp. 243–334.
7. This use of Nietzsche’s typology to classify attitudes towards a philosopher’s work was
inspired by a lecture on “Nietzsche’s Suprahistorical Gaze” by Hans Ruin, Uppsala
12.03.2004.
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correct presentation of Wittgenstein’s writings, and the placing of his
work in a biographical/historical context. 
3. The critical attitude strives to “break a past and dissolve it”, and this atti-
tude is, in our case, represented by “Wittgensteinian” philosophy that is
not so much interested in exegesis and proper representation of Wittgen-
stein’s own views as in the use of his method in dissolving philosophical
problems and destroying the Luftgebäude of metaphysics, thus freeing us
from pictures, illusions and misleading analogies that hold us captive.
However, we should be aware of the negative modes of such attitudes also in
the case of Wittgenstein:
1. The negative monumental attitude sees Wittgenstein as an unsurpass-
able, unassailable monument that we can only venerate and not really
emulate. Such an attitude, Nietzsche warns, tends to result in fanaticism.
2. The negative antiquarian attitude takes everything Wittgenstein ever
said, did, touched or wrote as something equally worthy of meticulous
preservation, thus turning scholarship into fetishism. A person possessed
of this attitude “envelops himself in a mouldy smell”, as Nietzsche puts
it, and finally sinks so deep, “dass er zuletzt mit jeder Kost zufrieden ist
und mit Lust selbst den Staub bibliographischer Quisquilien frisst”
(p. 268).
3. The negative critical attitude runs the risk of completely denying the
past by judging and destroying it, which amounts to a nihilistic attitude
and contempt towards history of philosophy and even philosophy as
such, seeing it as nothing more than a parade of worthless nonsense and
confusions (an attitude, to be sure, not completely unfamiliar to Witt-
genstein himself).
It is up to the reader to decide which (if any) of the different modes of his-
toricity are represented by the papers in this collection, but we venture to
claim that they do demonstrate “life-enhancing” ways of approaching Witt-
genstein. 
The collection opens with two papers on Wittgenstein’s relation to philoso-
phy. First, Knut Erik Tranøy, who became a friend of Wittgenstein’s after
meeting him in Cambridge in 1949, takes up the question of the relation
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between life and philosophy with particular reference to Wittgenstein, who
had made a profound impression upon him both as a philosopher and a
human being. In Wittgenstein’s case in particular, Tranøy notes, it is difficult
or even impossible to draw a line between philosophical and non-philo-
sophical life. 
Tranøy distinguishes two questions about the relation between human
life and philosophy:
Q1: What does or can philosophy do for the philosopher whose
philosophy we are talking about?
and
Q2: What can – or cannot – a philosopher’s philosophy do for
others?
As regards the first question, in a sense (and in his own words) philosophy
was Wittgenstein’s life. However, as Tranøy notes, this makes problematic
the fact that Wittgenstein was always seeking a way to finish with philo-
sophical activity. In the Tractatus, this finishing has the nature of a “final solu-
tion” to philosophical problems. If we take this seriously, as Tranøy insists
we should, then it is also clear that Wittgenstein’s life would have to change
as a result. Following the “logic” of his own philosophy, Tranøy writes, we
therefore see that Wittgenstein did at least try to cease being a philosopher,
taking up different non-philosophical careers. However, the philosophical
problems he thought had been solved for good reappear in his “new philo-
sophical life” from 1929 to 1951, this time as tormenting questions, and the
confident mood of the Tractatus gives way to resignation and pessimism, as
can be seen, for example, in the preface to the Investigations. 
With regard to Q2, Tranøy distinguishes three possible responses: indif-
ference, usefulness, and harmfulness. There is certainly a sense in which
much academic philosophy has been completely indifferent to Wittgenstein.
However, many in the profession would also argue that Wittgenstein has in
fact been a harmful influence. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself was always in
doubt whether his philosophy could be useful to anybody, or whether it in
fact did more harm than good to be exposed to his teaching. He was, in
Ryle’s words, a “philosophical genius and a pedagogical disaster”. When
Tranøy himself asked Wittgenstein why he had resigned his chair at Cam-
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bridge, the reply was: “Because there are only two or three of my students
about whom I could say I do not know I have done them any harm.”
Tranøy himself, however, is an example of a philosopher who, though nei-
ther a Wittgenstein scholar nor one of his pupils, has benefited from know-
ing and reading Wittgenstein. It has, he says, helped him to become clearer
about the nature of philosophy, and moral philosophy in particular.
At the end of his paper Tranøy asks what it is to be a philosopher. This
question, he notes, has no simple answer, but at least in Wittgenstein’s case it
is clear that philosophy cannot be considered a profession. It should rather
be viewed as a calling or vocation. But what does this imply for the nature
of the philosopher’s activity? Lars Hertzberg takes up this question by
addressing an issue that was absolutely fundamental for Wittgenstein: the
question of honesty. 
According to Hertzberg, Wittgenstein always regarded honesty as an issue
in philosophy, and the question of what it means to “try to keep philosophy
honest” is unavoidable for anyone working in the Wittgensteinian tradition.
Hertzberg is not saying that philosophers in that tradition are more honest
than others. His point is rather that for Wittgenstein “a concern with one’s
intellectual honesty is internal to the difficulty of philosophy”. The “Witt-
gensteinian tradition” in philosophy that Hertzberg talks about is, of course,
quite heterogeneous (as the papers in our collection show), but it is united
by the idea that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is radical in the sense that it is
conceivable only as a criticism of “more conventional ways of doing philo-
sophy”, as Hertzberg puts it. This has also led to the marginalization of the
Wittgensteinian tradition, especially within contemporary academic philo-
sophy. However, Hertzberg shows that the troubling aspect of the Wittgen-
steinian tradition is not its criticism of philosophy as such, but rather its
particular form of criticism, which renders it irrelevant, uninteresting, or
powerless in the eyes of representatives of the discipline’s more conventional
forms, be they “German-French” or “Anglo-Saxon”. 
Hertzberg thinks it would be a bad thing for philosophy, especially that of
the analytic tradition, to dissociate itself from Wittgenstein’s legacy, not least
because it would entail the loss of what we might call an “existential” atti-
tude to philosophy, which Hertzberg considers crucial to Wittgenstein. This
attitude is reflected in remarks where Wittgenstein says that “work on phi-
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losophy is really rather work on oneself ”, or that the difficulty of philosophy
is “not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a
change of attitude (Einstellung)”. Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is a constant
struggle against our own intellectual temptations, and this aspect of intellec-
tual struggle also underlies the title of Hertzberg’s essay. However, it is pre-
cisely this kind of attitude that prompts resistance among academic
philosophers. 
In his paper Hertzberg illuminates this attitude, and the demand for hon-
esty in philosophy, through a consideration of three examples: what he calls
the “deafness” of philosophers towards the use of words; Wittgenstein’s
remark concerning “a one-sided diet of examples”; and finally his remark
that “pretensions are a mortgage which burdens a philosopher’s capacity to
think”. 
In a famous remark in the Investigations (§ 118) Wittgenstein implies that
the philosopher should be under an obligation to “bring words back from
their metaphysical to their everyday use”. As Hertzberg notes, philosophers
tend to be suspicious of this idea, since it seems arbitrarily to assign a nor-
mative status to “everyday language” and to deny philosophy the right to
use its own specialized terminology. However, Hertzberg thinks the passage
should be read more carefully; it speaks about a way to respond when phi-
losophers describe their activities as an attempt to grasp the essence of, for
instance, knowledge. Consequently it exhorts us to remember how, for
example, knowledge-claims are used in actual situations, and how the sense
of this type of utterance depends on what the speaker seeks to do in making
it. But what, then, is the philosopher doing who seeks “to grasp the
essence” of a thing? Well, his problem is that he claims a right to use the
word differently from others (e.g. by raising the demand for a knowledge-
claim that is unconditionally valid regardless of context) while at the same
time using the word “knowledge” with the same sense as it has in “everyday
language”, i.e. he claims there can be a standard of correctness that is inde-
pendent of the actual use of our expressions. What this kind of philosopher
fails to see is “the real life” of the expressions he investigates, and thus he
could be accused of what Hertzberg calls “use-deafness”, which he regards
as “an occupational hazard with most analytic philosophers”.
This use-deafness is, according to Hertzberg’s diagnosis, closely related to
what Wittgenstein (in PI § 593) calls “a main cause of philosophical dis-
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ease”, namely “a one-sided diet” of examples. This is not to say that analytic
philosophers do not use examples, but rather that they do not let their
reflections on their examples become a part of the philosophical clarification
itself. The preferable approach would be to let our examples prompt the
questions of what it is we are doing in applying a certain concept. When
undertaking a philosophical investigation, Hertzberg maintains, we must
have the patience to “stop and look for examples”. The aim should not be
to “nail things down”; on the contrary, the use of examples is the only way
to find out what one is actually trying to say. In this sense examples serve
not to convey new information, but to make us face “what we already
know”. The primary function of examples in philosophy, Hertzberg says,
should be “to confront us with ourselves wanting to say a certain thing”. In
his view it is here that the analytic philosopher often goes wrong in his use
of examples. For instance Quine’s famous rabbit example illustrates the ten-
dency not to pause and let the example speak or “come alive”. For Quine,
all the example does is illustrate the indeterminacy of translation; however,
the very possibility of its illustrating this thesis depends on his failure to con-
sider the example closely enough. In Quine’s example, the speaker, his life,
and the context and circumstances of the utterance are all ignored; yet it
would be a description of precisely these things that could turn the example
into an illustration of the use of language, rather than a case of merely
“pointless phonic response”. 
Finally, Hertzberg considers a passage from On Certainty (§ 549), where
Wittgenstein notes that “pretensions are a mortgage which burdens a philo-
sopher’s capacity to think”. Hertzberg thinks that if the philosopher sets up a
goal for her investigation it will function as a “mortgage”, limiting the free-
dom of the investigation, since in philosophy, “we are looking at the world
through the eyes of bewilderment”. Indeed, if one knows where one is
going, there is no philosophical problem left (cf. PI § 123). The main dan-
ger in philosophy, as Hertzberg identifies it, is the danger of apriorism, the
idea that we can tell how things “must be”. 
This, however, leads to the further question of the very aim of the philo-
sopher’s activity. If the Wittgensteinian tradition in philosophy is, as
Hertzberg says, dependent upon critical interaction with other, more con-
ventional ways of doing philosophy, this inevitably raises questions about the
value and legitimacy of philosophy as such. Uncertainties with regard to
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legitimation seem to haunt academic philosophers: what is the value of phi-
losophy, is it worth the effort at all? As far as Wittgensteinian philosophy is
concerned, one senses a tension in Wittgenstein’s remarks on philosophy: is
the aim of philosophy ultimately to enable one to give it all up, or can we do
something better using the example of Wittgenstein? Hertzberg attempts to
strike a balance between these alternatives, or rather, to show that they are
not the only ones available. In his view, the very question of “the value of it
all” suggests a kind of confusion. Ultimately, this question is of an ethical
nature, a question about an attitude towards philosophy and life that cannot
be answered in the abstract or once and for all. Philosophy is only “worth
the effort”, Wittgenstein says, “if it receives a light from above” (CV p. 66).
The wish to explain “what philosophy is about” is a temptation we should
resist, Hertzberg concludes. Indeed, it can be seen as an example of the kind
of “mortgage” Wittgenstein was talking about. 
Tranøy’s and Hertzberg’s papers introduce a number of issues that are taken
up in other papers in this collection. One of these is the relation that Tranøy
considers between Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophy. Tranøy asks how
we should deal with the fact that Wittgenstein did change his mind about
the solution he arrived at in the Tractatus. He suggests that Wittgenstein felt
in some way morally obliged to change his mind about certain central ideas
in the Tractatus, despite the fact that philosophy seemed to him a “painfully
compulsive” activity (this is, of course, an aspect of what Hertzberg identi-
fies as the demand for intellectual honesty). Does this mean, Tranøy asks,
that Wittgenstein would have been inconsistent had he not abandoned some
of the most central ideas of the Tractatus, or that it was consistent of him to
change his mind about not doing philosophy any more? Tranøy leaves the
answer open, but the question is touched upon in a number of other papers
in this volume that deal with Wittgenstein’s early work. 
The first of these is a piece that we are especially happy to be able to
include in this collection, namely a discussion of the Tractatus by the late
Professor Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, the
successor to his chair in Cambridge, and one of the original heirs to his lit-
erary estate. With von Wright’s death in 2003 contemporary philosophy in
general and Wittgenstein scholarship in particular lost one of its most illus-
trious figures. During his last years, von Wright thought intensely about the
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Tractatus.8 His feeling was that he himself, as well as most commentators, had
previously misunderstood Wittgenstein’s book. In this paper he presents
some observations on a number of central and controversial terms in the
Tractatus: “truth”, “sense” and “nonsense”, and “thought”. 
Especially Wittgenstein’s use of the terms “unsinnig” and “sinnlos” has
been at the centre of the recent and sometimes heated debate about how to
understand the “nonsensicality” of Tractarian propositions or sentences.9
Von Wright does not directly refer to or take a stand in this debate, but what
he says clearly has a bearing on the issues. The question of truth and falsity
is, in von Wright’s view, a crucial issue in the Tractatus, and he feels that
commentators of the book have not clearly observed this. His main point is
that, according to the Tractatus, meaningful sentences are contingent, i.e. both
the sentence and its negation are meaningful. He maintains that the Tractatus
describes three different relations to truth. First, there is the bipolar relation
truth/falsity, which is the mark of meaningful sentences. Second, there are
tautologies, which have a unipolar relation to truth, since tautologies are
unconditionally true (TLP 4.461). Thus a tautology is also senseless (sinnlos)
but not nonsensical (unsinnig). The same applies to contradictions (which are
unconditionally false), and von Wright comments that both tautologies and
contradictions “are a sort of extreme case in the operation with otherwise
meaningful sentences”. However, there are also sentences that bear a zero-
polar relation to truth, i.e. which have no truth-value whatsoever; such sen-
tences include moral, aesthetic, religious and other valuations.
Von Wright’s conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s tripartite distinction
between contradictions, tautologies and meaningful propositions really
should not be understood vis-à-vis a relation to truth, since he thinks that
8. Due to illness, von Wright was unable to attend the Bergen conference. Instead, he
prepared a video tape of his lecture, and he was represented at the conference by his
assistant Dr. Risto Vilkko. However, the editors of this collection had the pleasure of
meeting and interviewing von Wright in Helsinki in February 2002, when he was pre-
sented an honorary doctorate from the University of Bergen. During our discussion
von Wright told us that he had recently been preoccupied with the question how to
read the Tractatus. He was especially concerned with the notion of truth and its relation
to the distinction between the senseless and the nonsensical.
9. Von Wright translates “Satz” with “sentence” and not “proposition”.
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“the sense in which necessary sentences are true and contradictory sentences
are false is very different from the sense in which contingent sentences are
either true or false”. In von Wright’s view, “true” and “false” should be
dropped altogether as attributes of logically necessary or impossible (non-
contingent) sentences. 
Given these distinctions, how are we to understand the sentences of the
Tractatus itself? In his preface Wittgenstein says that the truth of the thoughts
contained in the book seem to him “unassailable and definitive”. This, von
Wright claims, makes Wittgenstein guilty of an inconsistency; namely, he
defines “thought” (in TLP 3.5) as “the applied, thought, propositional
sign”, i.e. as a meaningful sentence. However, it is essential that sentences be
meaningful in virtue of being contingently true or false. The sentences of the
Tractatus, on the other hand, are neither contingent sentences nor logical
sentences. 
What should we make of this “muddle” or inconsistency? Von Wright
suggests that Tractarian sentences, since they do not describe states of affairs,
should be treated on a par with other sentences that display a zeropolar
truth-relation, e.g. value judgements. Yet norm statements and value judge-
ments do have a normative or evaluative meaning, and hence also “a use
within our language”; thus they do “say” something and can be understood,
even though strictly speaking they are senseless. However, since they can be
understood as expressing normative or evaluative meaning, they are not non-
sensical in the sense that “Socrates is identical” is nonsensical. The sentences
of the Tractatus, on the other hand, are without sense “in the stronger sense
of being nonsensical”. Although grammatically well formed and in some
sense “intelligible” they are not sentences in the Tractatus-sense of the term.
This is because they attempt to say something that cannot (within the limits
of the picture theory) be said. 
What, then, is the function of the Tractarian sentences? Von Wright says
that, although they do not say anything, they may show something of value
to the philosopher. But what precisely do the sentences of the Tractatus
attempt to show? Von Wright thinks their function is fairly clear: “Fighting
one’s way through them will show us something by taking us to a platform
from where we ‘see the world of so-sein, of contingent fact, rightly’”. This,
he concludes, is the moral sense of the Tractatus. The solution to philoso-
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phical problems is to see the futility of the attempt to transgress the bound-
aries of the “sayable”, i.e. the contingently true or false. 
Now, where does von Wright’s understanding of “nonsense” place him
in the debate about the Tractatus and its relation to the “late” Wittgenstein?10
Von Wright thinks we should distinguish carefully between “senseless” sen-
tences that “have a use within our language”, and sentences that are “just
plain nonsense”. But within the realm of the nonsensical von Wright also
makes an implicit distinction between sentences that are nonsense through
and through (“Socrates is identical”) and sentences that are grammatically
well formed and in some sense “intelligible” even though strictly speaking
nonsense (Tractarian sentences); by being nonsensical, they show us how we
should view the world of contingent truths, i.e. (in von Wright’s words) as
“undiluted by the philosopher’s nonsense”. This begins to look like a dis-
tinction between “significant” and “insignificant” nonsense11, and such an
impression is strengthened by von Wright’s claim that Wittgenstein is guilty
of inconsistency in the preface in talking about the “thoughts” expressed in
the book. 
But what criterion can we use to distinguish these two types of nonsense?
Von Wright seems to think that the sentences of Wittgenstein’s preface
should also be judged by the Tractarian definition of “thought” and “sense”
(even though these definitions are themselves ultimately nonsensical!). Thus
von Wright accepts, at least implicitly, that the Tractatus attempts to present a
theory of language and meaning, and that Wittgenstein is guilty of inconsis-
tency and irresolution in not adhering to his own theory in the preface. He
says that Wittgenstein really could have omitted the troublesome sentence
about the “unassailable and definitive” nature of the thoughts expressed in
the Tractatus (Wittgenstein actually begins the preface by talking about the
thoughts expressed in the book). Another alternative, promoted by the so-
called “resolute” reading, is to take Wittgenstein at his word, and try to find
a reading of both the main text and the preface that will accommodate what
10. For an introduction to the issues in this debate, see A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The
New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000).
11. Cf. C. Diamond, ”What Nonsense Might Be”, in The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
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von Wright sees as an “inconsistency” (for instance, by saying that Wittgen-
stein gives the illusion of presenting a theory in the Tractatus). But what von
Wright is really suggesting is that we could read the Tractatus without caring
for the preface at all, thus making an (implicit) distinction between what
could be called a “frame” and the book. Von Wright leaves open the ques-
tion as to why Wittgenstein fell into such an inconsistency or muddle. He
seems to suggest that Wittgenstein was merely careless, but this will be
unacceptable to “resolute” readers of the Tractatus. As we will see, Cora
Diamond and James Conant address some of these issues in their papers. 
Commenting on the relation between “early” and “late” Wittgenstein, von
Wright claims that Wittgenstein later thought that we cannot find a final
solution to philosophical problems – linguistic confusion can only be solved
temporarily, and must be addressed again and again. Thus von Wright char-
acterizes the difference between early and late Wittgenstein as the difference
between an “absolutist” and a “relativistic” view. But this difference, he
argues, is hardly fundamental. His claim is corroborated by the fact that
Wittgenstein wrote as early as 1913 that philosophy is “purely descriptive”
(NL p. 93). However, we can ask ourselves what the purpose of such
description is, and how such a task should be approached. We can also ask
why Wittgenstein’s early philosophy looks so different from his later philo-
sophy, if they share the same starting point. These questions are addressed in
Marie McGinn’s contribution to this volume. She wants to show how Witt-
genstein’s early philosophy of language must be understood as pursuing a
descriptive and clarificatory aim, although the nature of this clarification is
determined by a preconceived idea of what such a clarification should
achieve. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is determined by a set of problems
concerning logic and language, and all these problems are, McGinn claims,
aspects of what Wittgenstein in his Notebooks calls the “single great prob-
lem”, viz. the problem of the nature of the proposition (NB p. 23). 
Thus the early Wittgenstein seems to think that, once the nature of the
proposition has been clarified in its entirety, all the other problems that pre-
occupy him will also become clear: the nature and status of the propositions
of logic, the nature of negation, of inference, and so on. McGinn shows
how Wittgenstein arrives at this “absolutist” idea of “the single great prob-
lem”, and how it governs his way of undertaking the descriptive and clarifi-
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catory task of philosophy in the Tractatus. Incidentally, as McGinn herself
notes, this also means that according to her the Tractatus is concerned with a
substantial task, which is the elucidation of the nature of the proposition,
rather than merely presenting the illusion that this is so (as claimed by “reso-
lute” readers).
According to McGinn, Wittgenstein shares both the problems that pre-
occupy him in his early work, and (at least to some extent) the preconcep-
tions or commitments that frame that early philosophy, with Frege and
Russell. The basic shared assumption here is what McGinn calls the “frame-
work intuition” that logic is universal and a priori: logic is the essential
framework for all thought, as it aims at the truth. Logic is thus concerned
with universal principles of reasoning, i.e. the principles of judgement as
such, and consequently with the a priori form of thought. Wittgenstein
shares with Frege and Russell a general commitment to this framework.
However, McGinn also shows that Wittgenstein came to think of some
aspects of Frege’s and Russell’s views, especially their universalist conception
of logic, as fundamentally flawed, and indeed as being in conflict with the
“framework intuition”. 
The problem of clarifying the nature and status of the propositions and
laws of logic constitutes the core of Wittgenstein’s attempt to clarify the
nature of the proposition. His criticism of Frege’s and Russell’s universalist
conception of logic focuses on the question of whether the laws of logic are
maximally general truths and whether logic can be seen as “a science of
completely generalized propositions” (NB p. 11). This is something Witt-
genstein could not accept, since it conflicts with the “framework intuition”
that logic is the essence of thought and has a unique status. Something that
depends for its truth solely on its own logical properties cannot properly
speaking be called a proposition, since it cannot represent how things are in
the world (compare this to what von Wright says about the problems of
talking about sentences that have a unipolar relation to truth). Logic, for
Wittgenstein, cannot be something for which the question of truth arises,
since “logic must take care of itself ” – it must already be in place in order
for us to express judgements that are true or false, i.e. it is given with the lan-
guage in which we express thoughts that are true or false. It is this logical
form of possible states of affairs that language itself manifests that must be
made perspicuous, and this is something Frege and Russell failed to realize.
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Thus, McGinn claims, Wittgenstein’s recognition that the question of
truth or evidence does not arise for the propositions of logic also implies a
rejection of the universalist conception of Frege and Russell. The main
problem of this conception is that, while it tries to account for logic in
terms of its objective truth, it fails to make perspicuous the a priori status of
logic, a status which entails that “the logic of the world is prior to all truth
and falsehood” (NB p. 14). Wittgenstein accepts that there are completely
general propositions, but these are not propositions of logic; they are rather
“accidentally general” propositions (NB p. 17). Logic, on the other hand, is
not concerned with what is true, but with what is essential before any pro-
position can be compared with reality for truth or falsity. 
McGinn further points out that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege and
Russell also concerns their conception of the nature of logical inference,
which again is an aspect of the “single great problem”. Frege and Russell see
inference as justified by the laws of logic which are seen on a par with the
laws of physics. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thinks that once the rela-
tion between propositions is made perspicuous, inference, too, will be
grounded in the propositions themselves, not in any general laws of logic. A
proposition expresses its sense, and the relations between propositions with
sense justify our inference from one proposition to another. 
Thus both of the problems Wittgenstein found within the universalist
view (the nature and status of propositions of logic, and the nature of infer-
ence) bring him back to his “fundamental problem”. Wittgenstein’s clarifi-
catory work in the Tractatus, McGinn claims, emerged from what he
regarded as deficiences in the work of Frege and Russell, and which pose
the problem of the nature of the proposition. Both Frege’s conception of
truth and Russell’s theory of judgement, Wittgenstein thought, rest on the
mistake of treating propositions on the model of names, i.e. the logical con-
stants as predicates and relations, and propositions as relata. This fails to
make clear how a proposition expresses its sense, which, according to Witt-
genstein, is something it achieves in virtue of its essential bipolarity (a point
that von Wright also stresses in his paper).
McGinn’s conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of language,
although proceeding from certain preconceptions about logic and language
that he shares with Frege and Russell, should be understood as having a
clarificatory aim. This also led him to identify and criticize certain essential
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shortcomings in the views of Frege and Russell. What is important,
McGinn argues, is that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege and Russell is not
motivated by theoretical commitments; instead it proceeds in a manner with
which we are now familiar from his later philosophy – it took the form of
“assembling reminders” of aspects of our use of language that clash with
Frege’s and Russell’s philosophical conception of how language works, with
the aim of achieving a perspicuous representation of the problems at issue.
However, McGinn contends that, ultimately, the clarificatory achievement
of Wittgenstein’s early work remains limited, since it is completely deter-
mined by his own restrictive preconceptions concerning logic and the
nature of the proposition, namely, that there must be a final answer to the
question about the “general form of the proposition”. 
Although both von Wright and McGinn deal with Wittgenstein’s early
views, both address the question of the relation between “early” and “late”
Wittgenstein. We should recall that von Wright considers the difference to
be big but “hardly fundamental”. In a similar vein, McGinn’s conclusion is
that Wittgenstein’s whole work proceeds from the idea that philosophy is
“purely descriptive” and clarificatory, and that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between philosophy and scientific theorizing. But in his early work
this clarificatory task is hampered by his preconceptions about language and
logic. Both von Wright’s and McGinn’s papers, though dealing with Witt-
genstein’s “early” thought, thus place it in the context of his later work,
since both authors point out features of his early thinking that from a com-
prehensive perspective on his philosophy appear as mistaken.
Consequently one can say that both von Wright and McGinn implicitly
challenge the “received view” of there being an early Wittgenstein (meta-
physical thinker and logicist author of the Tractatus) and a late Wittgenstein
(“ordinary language philosopher” of the Investigations), whose views on both
philosophy and language are incommensurate. Generally speaking, this view
has been the object of much criticism. Some scholars have wanted to chal-
lenge it by adding either a “middle” Wittgenstein (roughly 1929–1936), or,
more recently, a “third”, post-Investigations Wittgenstein (1945–1951).12
Another subject of controversy has been exactly when the turn from “early”
to “late” philosophy is supposed to have happened. The most radical chal-
lenge to the traditional view has been one lately advocated especially by
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Cora Diamond: that there really is no once and for all “turn” from the early
to the late philosophy – Wittgenstein’s philosophy is characterized by con-
tinuity, even though his way of formulating philosophical thoughts under-
went radical changes. These disagreements have, as already mentioned in
connection with the papers by von Wright and McGinn, focused in parti-
cular on the status of the Tractatus, and the nature of the “nonsensicality” of
Tractarian sentences.
In her own paper, Cora Diamond explicitly addresses the question of
how to read the Tractatus and how to understand the relations between the
Tractarian and the post-Tractarian philosophy by taking a look at one of the
first defenders of a “one-Wittgenstein” view, viz. Peter Winch, who argued
for the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, beginning with his 1969 essay
that took that phrase for its title. Winch’s essay was prompted by the feeling
(shared by Diamond) that the two-Wittgensteins view was not only wrong,
but positively harmful to a true understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophi-
cal achievement. 
Winch pioneered a new way of looking at Wittgenstein’s work, and was,
according to Diamond, also among the first to realize the radical nature of
Wittgenstein’s thought, both early and late. The “metaphysical” reading of
the Tractatus in particular impedes such an understanding, Diamond claims.
In her paper she traces the evolution of Winch’s thinking upon these themes
from the 1969 essay to his last work, and especially the change that occurs in
his understanding of the aims of the Tractatus. 
Winch developed his view of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in a
critical dialogue with Norman Malcolm’s influential “two-Wittgensteins”
view and his metaphysical/mentalistic reading of the Tractatus.13 Another
important influence on Winch was Rush Rhees, who according to Dia-
mond actually laid the groundwork for an understanding of Wittgenstein as
one philosopher. Following Rhees, Winch located the continuity of Witt-
genstein’s philosophy in his concern with the nature of logic, and understood
12. Cf. D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.): The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Work
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
13. See N. Malcolm: Memory and Mind (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1977); Nothing is Hidden
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
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his later philosophy not so much as a turning away from this interest as a
new approach to the subject. Of course, neither Diamond nor Winch deny
that we can talk about a shift between Wittgenstein’s early Tractarian and his
post-Tractarian philosophy, a shift both in methods and in the subjects dis-
cussed. However, both Diamond and Winch think we should not let this
shift obscure the essential unity of his philosophy. Winch locates what is
central to the post-Tractatus thought in the totally new significance of partic-
ular cases in philosophy, which involves a new understanding of generality.
The gist of Winch’s critique of Malcolm is that, while Malcolm recognizes
what is central to the new approach, he fails to see how questions of logic
are still centrally involved in Wittgenstein’s later treatment of various topics. 
The debate between Malcolm and Winch in the 1980s involved a dispute
about Malcolm’s mentalistic reading of the Tractatus, according to which the
Tractatus essentially contains a philosophy of language resting upon a meta-
physics, these being mediated by a philosophy of mind. A somewhat differ-
ent kind of mentalistic reading has been put forward more recently by Peter
Hacker in his criticism of Winch.14 This debate turns upon how to under-
stand the purported “mentalism” of the Tractatus, and in particular on a
reading of TLP 3.11, especially its second sentence:
Wir benützen das sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen (…) des Satzes
als Projektion der möglichen Sachlage. Die Projektionsmethode is
das Denken des Satz-Sinnes. 
We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (…) as a projection of
a possible situation. The projection method is the thinking of the
propositional sense. [Diamond’s translation]
The mentalistic reading, as Rhees noted, is lent false support by the Pears-
McGuinness translation, which reads “the method of projection is to think
of the sense of the proposition”. Instead, the correct reading (according to
Rhees, and his reading is endorsed by Winch) takes the method of projec-
tion to be what actually explains what it is to think the proposition’s sense.
14. P.M.S. Hacker: “Naming, Thinking, and Meaning in the Tractatus”, Philosophical Inves-
tigations 22 (1999), pp. 119–135.
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What is at stake here, as Diamond puts it, is really the overall understanding
of the aim of the Tractatus, i.e. what Wittgenstein might think he has accom-
plished in clarifying the logic of language. This was, of course, also the ques-
tion addressed by McGinn in her paper, and McGinn’s understanding of
Wittgenstein’s aims and her identification of the “framework intuition”
clearly supports a non-mentalistic reading (although she does not comment
directly on TLP 3.11). As Diamond notes, the various mentalistic readings
of the Tractatus are committed to a link between the logic of language and a
structure of possibilities external to it (i.e. a link involving mental connec-
tions with the objects and their structure of possibilities), and Winch’s point
was that this totally obscured Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus, since it
would mean looking for a kind of basis for logic. This kind of interpretation
of 3.11 fails to account for how radical the notion of “logic taking care of
itself ” is, and what is involved in the idea that we cannot make mistakes in
logic. 
However, Diamond thinks that both Rhees and Winch get into difficul-
ties when they try to link two issues in their reading of 3.11: the issue of
whether the thinking of the proposition’s sense is supposed to explain or be
explained by the method of projection, and the issue whether 3.11 supports
the idea that a perceptible sentence is used to mean something in virtue of a
mental process. Diamond herself wants to give what she thinks is a more
natural reading of the passage (reflected in her suggestion for a better transla-
tion, see above). Instead of saying that the thinking of the sense of a propo-
sition is explained by the idea of a method of projection, Diamond reads the
passage as saying that thinking a sense is explained in terms of a thought’s
thinking a situation in that it is a picture in logical space: “We make pictures,
using methods of depiction in a space; these pictures, these representations,
in that they are in logical space, are thoughts.” Diamond also points to pas-
sages in the Prototractatus that support her reading. 
She then goes on to discuss another problem in Winch’s reading of the
Tractatus, which concerns the meaning of names. Winch ascribed a use
account of names to Wittgenstein; simple names in the Tractatus do genu-
inely refer, but this is dependent only on their functioning in a certain way
within a symbolism, i.e. on their having a certain logico-syntactical role.
The same thing, Winch claimed, applies to ordinary names; reference is
given entirely in terms of how the sign in question is used (i.e. what is meant
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by a name is entirely settled by how you use it). However, as Hacker has
pointed out in his criticism of Winch, this is certainly wrong when it comes
to ordinary names; their reference cannot be determined by their use alone.
Hacker further claims that neither does Winch’s account fit the simple
names of the Tractatus, since Wittgenstein allows there to be more than one
object of the same logical form (e.g. TLP 2.0233). Diamond agrees that this
is a flaw in Winch’s reading, but does not think it is fatal, since the alterna-
tives Winch and Hacker operate with (either the meaning is completely
dependent on use, or there has to be a mind-forged connection) are not the
only ones. Instead Diamond says we should realize that making sense of the
possibility of different objects of the same logical form can only be achieved
internally, through language – the philosophical picture of the possible
ambiguity in our names is confused and builds upon a kind of external per-
spective (here Diamond endorses a reading by Warren Goldfarb). Thus Dia-
mond concludes that this is not a fatal flaw in Winch’s reading. However, it
is connected to an overall problem she sees in Winch’s understanding of the
Tractatus, and which she calls his formalism. 
This formalism, she claims, is clearly visible in the way Winch under-
stands the distinction between sense and nonsense in the Tractatus. In her
view, Winch follows Rhees in understanding Wittgenstein’s aim in the Trac-
tatus as the philosophical task of straightening out once and for all the dis-
tinction between sense and nonsense. Diamond, of course, disagrees with
this view, which she claims is at the heart of the formalist reading. The for-
malist reading says that the formal characteristics of the sign fully determine
(in accordance with a general rule) both whether the sign has sense and
what the sense is (this view is, Diamond points out, already in play in
Winch’s idea about how ‘names’ function). Diamond thinks that such a for-
malist reading is completely inconsistent with the text itself, and in fact even
more misleading than the mentalistic reading. 
A crucial element in the formalist reading that Diamond picks out is the
(mis)understanding of the nature of the distinction between sense and non-
sense. Both Rhees and Winch claim that the Tractatus aims to provide a gen-
eral rule or principle for making that distinction. Diamond, instead, claims
that the aim of the distinction “is to lead us to recognize that in doing phi-
losophy our ordinary capacity to descry nonsense has been suspended”.
That is, the meaninglessness of a combination of signs is not a feature of the
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expressions themselves, nor is it a result of not representing a possible com-
bination of metaphysically given objects; instead, it occurs because we have
failed to give meaning to some sign or signs. 
Another problem that follows from the Rhees-Winch reading is reflected
in their view that the aim of the Tractatus is a kind of grammatical clarifica-
tion. Diamond thinks this is right, but the formalistic approach leads to the
view that the apparently metaphysical propositions of the Tractatus should be
understood as grammatical propositions, for instance, that the Tractatus tries
to establish features of the logical syntax of words like “world”, “fact”,
“object”, etc. This, she thinks, cannot be right. She insists that the Tractatus
sentences containing words like “object” cannot be replaced by ordinary-
language sentences where “object” functions as a variable, and thus Tractar-
ian sentences cannot be deemed to exhibit features of the grammar or use of
such words. Again, the formalist reading says that the combination of signs
itself determines whether it is nonsense, and this Diamond thinks is clearly in
conflict with what Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus. Diamond’s own view
could be summed up by saying that we should take seriously the idea that
Wittgenstein is using remarks that have a certain built-in unclarity (resulting
precisely from the use of formal terms as if they were proper concept words)
that readers do not at first recognize, but which Wittgenstein intends should
be recognized by them, and that a formalist reading does not allow us to see
this. Thus it also prevents us from seeing clearly how Wittgenstein’s clarifi-
catory work in the Tractatus is connected to the kind of clarification he aims
at in his later philosophy. 
Despite these criticisms Diamond emphasizes the importance of Winch
as someone who pioneered a true understanding of the unity of Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy. Diamond thinks that Winch also applied the conception
of how Wittgenstein’s work hangs together in the exploration of the notion
of logical generality that he undertakes in his own work. As Diamond sees
it, this understanding is apparent not so much in the form of an argument, as
in Winch’s way of exploring issues such as the role of generality and particu-
larity in our concept of a human being, or suffering and our responses to it.
Cora Diamond is, as we noted, one of the most influential representatives of
the so-called “resolute reading” of the Tractatus. In the next paper, James
Conant, also a prominent “resolute reader”, gives a presentation of this read-
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ing and outlines its far-reaching exegetical consequences concerning Witt-
genstein’s whole philosophy. This kind of reading has been criticized
particularly because of its alleged commitment to a problematic and
counter-intuitive “one-Wittgenstein” view, which is said to follow from the
“resolute reading’s” claim that the Tractatus contains no substantial philo-
sophical theories or theses. According to resolute readers, Wittgenstein was,
already in his “early” philosophy, committed to the idea of philosophy being
an elucidatory activity rather than a body of doctrines.
Resolute readings thus challenge many “received truths” about Wittgen-
stein, given by “standard readings” of the Tractatus: e.g. that he attempted, in
the Tractatus, to formulate a substantive theory of the relation between
thought, language, and reality, which he later criticized and rejected; that
the nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus are actually an (ultimately unsuc-
cessful) attempt to formulate philosophical theses about the conditions of
meaningfulness; that the nonsensical sentences of the Tractatus show some-
thing that cannot be said; etc. The easiest way to define a standard reading
would be to say that in the Tractatus the standard reader finds a number of
substantive philosophical theses formulated and defended which we must
understand together in order to understand the work as a whole. The reso-
lute reading, alternatively, says that in order to understand the author of the
Tractatus we must take him at his word: we should not willy-nilly ascribe
theses and doctrines to him, but rather recognize them as nonsense through
and through in order to be able to complete the task the author has set us.
Conant himself notes that it is somewhat misleading to speak about the
resolute reading, since there are many varieties of approaches that could be
labeled “resolute”, and since “a resolute reading” is a programme for both
reading and interpreting the Tractatus rather than merely representing a read-
ing (in any strong sense). The dispute between “resolute” and “standard”
readings, as Conant understands it, hinges on the understanding of TLP
6.54. In this famous passage Wittgenstein writes that his sentences serve as
elucidations, and that anyone who understands him will eventually recog-
nize them as nonsensical, to be used as rungs or steps on the ladder that is
eventually to be thrown away. The primary characteristic of a resolute read-
ing is the rejection of the central tenet of standard readings: the idea that the
author of the Tractatus would first demand that his reader accept a substan-
tive theory of the conditions of sense (involving for instance the so-called
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picture theory of meaning), and then apply this theory to the work itself.
This would enable the reader to recognize the elucidatory sentences as non-
sensical. However, this reading contains a moment of “irresoluteness” since
such a reader is committed to saying that the Tractarian sentences must be
understandable in some substantial sense in spite of (or at the same time as)
being recognized as nonsense thus committing himself to a view of “sub-
stantial nonsense”.
In other words, the irresoluteness in the “standard readings” derives from
ascribing to the Tractatus a theory which its author endorses and must rely
upon to be able to proceed with his philosophical critique (drawing up the
boundaries of sense), yet which he must also simultaneously regard as non-
sense. Instead, says Conant, the resolute reading does not take the presence
of this paradox in the text to be a symptom of a kind of wavering or irreso-
lution on part of the author (like von Wright implies in his paper), but
rather as a part of the ladder that we (the readers) have to throw away.
Thus, according to Conant, the “rungs of the ladder” are moments of
understanding the author, and each such moment shows that the reader’s ear-
lier putative “state of understanding” was illusory. Every such moment of
understanding also involves a change in the reader (which also is one way to
understand Wittgenstein’s dictum about work on philosophy being work on
oneself – see CV p. 24). Thus the sentences are überwunden, being under-
stood (by the reader) to be nonsense through and through, i.e. as failing to
make genuine determinations of meaning, despite initially having presented
the illusion of doing so. What the reader has to achieve, then, is clarity – he
has to be able to see trough the illusion. This understanding can, however,
only happen piecemeal: as Conant sees it, every reader of the Tractatus must
begin as a “standard” reader and work her way through the book sentence
by sentence, reaching the “moments of recognition” one by one. 
Now, given the far-reaching consequences this kind of reading has upon
the understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, many “standard readers”
have criticized the “resolute reading” for being nothing but a programme or
manifesto telling us how not to read the book, and have challenged “resolute
readers” to give (if this paradoxical formulation can be excused) some sub-
stance to this allegedly non-substantial account. We must remember that
Wittgenstein never says that all sentences in the Tractatus are to be recog-
nized as nonsensical. Thus, say standard readers, in order to be capable of
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assessing a “resolute” reading, we need to be told more than just that some of
the sentences are nonsense; we need to be told how to recognize precisely
which sentences serve as the elucidations to be “thrown away” (which obvi-
ously is no easy task). In this paper, Conant accepts this criticism and takes
up the challenge, and indeed lists examples of sentences that could form the
“rungs of the ladder”.
Conant proposes that we can arrive at a tentative preliminary list of can-
didate sentences through the following procedure: 
1. A given standard reader compiles a list of sentences that can be associated
with alleged philosophical theses he would ascribe to the work. 
2. A given resolute reader compiles a set of sentences taken to be examples
of Tractarian elucidatory nonsense.
3. The intersection of these lists will constitute the list of sentences about
which the standard and the resolute reader disagree most, and will con-
stitute (for the purpose of the debate between that standard reader and
that resolute reader) the central examples of “rungs of the ladder”.
On a “resolute” understanding, items found on this list, e.g. “thought and
language are able to represent reality because they mirror the logical form of
reality”, consequently do not represent insights into the nature of thought
that should be worked out as philosophical positions or doctrines to be
ascribed to the author of the Tractatus (e.g. idealism, realism, or solipsism).
Instead, they are to be unmasked as philosophical temptations that the
author intends the reader to overcome. Properly understood, the “insights”
vanish when we come to understand that what we are after is not any meta-
physical answer to these questions, but a proper understanding of their non-
sensicality.
Now, as we already mentioned, a common criticism of this kind of read-
ing is that it obliterates the difference between “early” and “late” Wittgen-
stein by (mis)reading the Tractatus with the benefit of hindsight, ascribing to
the author of the Tractatus the non-dogmatic and non-metaphysical attitude
of the late Wittgenstein, thus constructing him as a “therapeutic” philoso-
pher avant la lettre. How should we in that case deal with Wittgenstein’s own
scathing criticism of his earlier work and its metaphysical presuppositions
(e.g. in PI § 97)? Conant does not deny Wittgenstein’s later self-criticism,
but he maintains that its target is not the items of the first list; instead, he
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provides a second list representing unwitting commitments that figure in
Wittgenstein’s early work and which are the actual target of his later criti-
cism. The list represents what could be called the early Wittgenstein’s “blind
spots”: i.e, as Conant puts it, “philosophical conceptions from which the
author of the Tractatus failed to wean himself ”. These items have mainly to
do with Wittgenstein’s understanding of logic and logical notation and its
role in philosophical elucidation (e.g. “there is such a thing as the logical
order of our language”). According to Conant, this kind of list can make us
see how much dogmatism there actually is in the Tractatus, and thus how big
the difference is between “early” and “late” Wittgenstein. 
But how are we to draw the line between the first list (representing
philosophical temptations Wittgenstein wanted to wean the reader from)
and the second list (representing unwitting metaphysical commitments on
Wittgenstein’s own part)? Conant admits that the question is very delicate
and that the line cannot be drawn once and for all. One solution would be
to say that all these items belong to the first list; however, Conant thinks that
the only way of making sense of either Wittgenstein’s early work or his own
later criticism of it is to acknowledge that the author of the Tractatus was
blind to his own dogmatic presuppositions. So the irony is that Wittgen-
stein’s aim in the Tractatus was to bring metaphysics to an end, but that his
own method rested on problematic and dogmatic metaphysical presupposi-
tions. This allows us to see both the continuity and the discontinuity in his
thought, concludes Conant. (It would also explain why the Tractatus is so
difficult to understand and why it is so difficult even to agree upon Wittgen-
stein’s aims in the book.)
This brings us to Conant’s third list. This list represents moments in
Wittgenstein’s work that can alternately mark either continuity or disconti-
nuity, depending upon the attitude one takes towards these items. This also
means that the candidate items are sentences that correspond closely to for-
mulations both in the Tractatus and the Investigations. The sentences on this
list can either be understood as showing a particular unwitting preconcep-
tion about how things must be (and thus also belonging on list two, repre-
senting a moment of discontinuity), or as something that may be ascribed
both to the author of the Tractatus and the author of the Investigations (thus
representing a moment of continuity). The possibility of alterative under-
standings of these sentences is also important for an understanding of the
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dialectical and dialogic character of Wittgenstein’s writings. To take one
example: “Every sentence in our everyday language is in order as it is.”
Reflection upon candidate items for this third list, Conant says, also
brings out the complexity of the relation between early and later Wittgen-
stein, and should allow us to see that there is a plausible middle course
between “zealous mono-Wittgensteinianism” (saying that early and later
Wittgenstein simply agreed about the items on the third list) and “intracta-
ble poly-Wittgensteinianism” (saying that the early and later Wittgenstein
agreed on nothing of importance).
Both Diamond’s and Conant’s papers explicitly address the vexed question
that David Stern takes as the title for his paper: “How many Wittgensteins?”
It is often thought that the “resolute” reading must, with emphasis, answer
“one” to this question, though as we have seen from Contant’s paper, the
question is a very intricate one, and the answer to it depends much on
whether we want to emphasize aspects of continuity or discontinuity in
Wittgenstein’s thought. Stern, too, thinks that the answer to this question is
far from clear. In his Übersicht of the debates concerning the nature of Witt-
genstein’s philosophy, Stern identifies three main areas of disagreement:
1. The debate between a “two-Wittgensteins” and a “one-Wittgenstein”
interpretation.
2. Among the adherents of “two-Wittgensteins”, the questions of when
the late philosophy begins and the nature of the main differences
between the early and late philosophy.
3. A disagreement between those who hold that Wittgenstein ends tradi-
tional philosophy in order to do philosophy better, and those who claim
he wanted to end philosophy and teach us to get by without a replace-
ment. 
Stern argues that the whole debate about one or two Wittgensteins rests on
the problematic supposition either that in its essentials Wittgenstein’s philo-
sophy never changed, or that there is a fundamental, once-and-for-all
change between the early and the late philosophy. Stern thinks it odd that
the debate is carried on in such a polarized way. Of course, depending on
their use, such labels as the “early”, “late”, “middle”, “third” Wittgenstein,
and so on, can be fairly innocuous. But in Stern’s view the problem is that
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such labels and manners of speech imply questionable commitments that the
participants in the debate tend not to see. Moreover, such distinctions do
not draw attention to particularities but talk instead about some kind of
metaphysical “essence” of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. But as soon as one
looks at the particular cases, any neat distinctions crumble. Stern summa-
rizes nine different positions on the doxographical question about the point
(if any) at which Wittgenstein’s purported “late” philosophy began, ranging
from Diamond’s and Feyerabend’s views that there really is no turn, to von
Savigny’s implicit claim that it did not happen until the late 1940s. Each
view can, of course, be supported by different kinds of evidence. 
A connected and no less vexed question concerns the nature of the “late”
philosophy. It is clear that in some sense it is a criticism of philosophical
errors or mistakes. But where does or should this criticism lead us? Stern
distinguishes here two main readings, which give different answers to the
question of how to understand Wittgenstein’s attempt to end philosophy:
the “Pyrrhonian” and the “non-Pyrrhonian” reading. Pyrrhonian scepti-
cism is (at least in the form attributable to Sextus Empiricus) sceptical of any
and all philosophical doctrines and theories (including itself). According to
the Pyrrhonian reading, then, Wittgenstein aims at a therapeutic critique of
all philosophy, including his own, and this should allow us to stop doing
philosophy altogether. According to non-Pyrrhonians, on the other hand,
he wanted to end traditional philosophy so as to be able to do philosophy bet-
ter. Stern notes that in practice, most Wittgenstein scholars oscillate between
these different views even when ostensibly subscribing to one of them. 
Stern argues that both sides can in fact find ample support for their differ-
ent positions in unresolved tensions within Wittgenstein’s own writings. He
also claims that this struggle between conflicting impulses gives Wittgen-
stein’s thought a peculiar vitality and importance. However, Stern also
thinks that Wittgenstein only fully succeeded in giving expression to this
struggle in his most carefully revised writings, in particular, in the first part
of the Investigations, the dialogical structure of which allows this struggle to
find its proper expression. Both sides of the debate, Stern concludes, have
been overly dogmatic, mainly because they have misread or missed the
essentially dialogical character of the Investigations. 
The problem with Wittgenstein scholarship, as Stern sees it, is the lack of
contact between scholars interested in the style of the Investigations, and
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Nachlass scholars. Stern thinks that critical study of the Nachlass is vital for
our understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its aims, but such a
study should pay close attention to the stylistic features of his writings. A
problem with using the Nachlass is the temptation to read it with the benefit
of hindsight, finding the distinctive features of Wittgenstein’s later thought
and style prefigured in the earlier writings. But this means that not enough
attention is given to the use and context of these passages. Stern is conse-
quently critical of the “passage hunting” approach to the Nachlass, i.e.
attempts to settle when and where certain arguments first occurred in his
writings. Such an approach makes it too easy to regard Wittgenstein’s more
doctrinaire and systematic assertions (for instance in the Big Typescript) as
expressions of philosophical convictions that underlie the Investigations.
What Wittgenstein did with the early material, Stern claims, was not so
much a sharpening and refinement of arguments as making it “more dialec-
tical and less didactic”. In this way he achieved a balance between Pyrrho-
nian scepticism and non-Pyrrhonian dogmatism, thereby inviting the reader
to engage in a dialogue that is ultimately about the possibility of philosophy.
Thus in the first part of Investigations (at least §§ 1–310), Wittgenstein is very
careful not to make doctrinaire or substantial assertions about for example
“grammar”, or the primacy of practice. Stern does in fact think that the
change that occurs between the period 1933–1935 and the Investigations
amounts to a fundamental change in philosophical outlook; but he also
thinks that that balance between the dogmatic and the “therapeutic” or crit-
ical attitude is not maintained throughout the Investigations, and that it is
absent from much of the post-Investigations work. All this is missed if we do
not look at the peculiar stylistic achievement of the Investigations, Stern
claims. 
Stern finally recommends that we should “give up our reliance on simple
stories of misery and glory”, together with such potentially misleading labels
as “the early”, “the late” Wittgenstein and the like. This still leaves us with
all the hard questions, he concludes. Stern’s point could be summarized by
saying that the debates about radical changes in Wittgenstein’s philosophical
views presuppose the very un-Wittgensteinian assumption of polarized
alternatives. Turning to Wittgenstein’s views on family resemblances, Stern
claims that his writings are related in different ways, and that we should not
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be looking for “the general form of Wittgenstein’s philosophy”, but should
expect instead to find a “complicated network of criss-crossing similarities”. 
Stern has described our next contributor, Eike von Savigny, as someone
who maintains that questions about the genesis and composition of Witt-
genstein’s texts are irrelevant to our understanding of his writings; thus von
Savigny, in his commentary on the Investigations,15 approaches the whole of
Part I of that work as a unified text, containing a single argument. In keep-
ing with this approach, his paper displays a “text-immanent” and Nachlass-
independent approach to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Here, von Savigny uses
Wittgenstein to sketch a “use theory of meaning”, which he then applies to
first-person psychological utterances, understood as avowals. The result is
that the commonly accepted understanding of such avowals determines the
speaker’s mental state. He then goes on to generalize this conclusion to the
expression of mental states in non-verbal behaviour, and claims that here,
too, commonly accepted reactions to this behaviour determine the nature of
the speaker’s mental state, in the same way as with verbal expressive behav-
iour. Thus von Savigny extracts a coherent view or even an “anti-individua-
listic theory” of the mental from Wittgenstein’s remarks on avowals and
meaning as use; von Savigny himself notes that this is controversial, but he
considers such an attempt valid since Wittgenstein’s ideas are sufficiently
interesting and coherent to make this possible. Furthermore he thinks that
“if one reads Wittgenstein as an author who endeavors not to utter any con-
tradictory rubbish”, such an interpretation is warranted. 
Von Savigny begins by sketching out the following idea, which he
derives from the Investigations: elements of language owe their meaning to
their role in language-games, which in turn are complex behavioural regu-
larities. The linguistic elements of language-games have meaning only in so
far as those language-games are substantial enough for such meaning to
emerge (i.e. for the behavioural regularities to constitute rule-following
behaviour). He thinks this view is established by Wittgenstein’s thought
experiment in PI §§ 206–207 about the explorer who tries to make sense of
15. E. von Savigny: Wittgensteins “Philosophische Untersuchungen”. Ein Kommentar für Leser, 2
Bände, (Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann, 1994–1996, 2nd edition).
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a foreign language. He admits, however, that it is difficult to fill out this idea
so as to get a substantial theory, since Wittgenstein supplies very few exam-
ples of such behavioural regularities. One clue is given in § 268, where
Wittgenstein addresses the question of what it takes for something to be a
meaningful instance of giving a gift. In this case, we can isolate certain “pre-
conditions” or circumstances, an utterance, and certain practical conse-
quences of the utterance. These consequences constitute the generally
accepted understanding of the utterance and thereby, von Savigny claims,
determine its meaning. Thus von Savigny finds at least the rudiments of a
kind of speech-act theory in the Investigations. 
He goes on to ask how this insight can be applied to utterances that a
speaker uses to express his mental state. Here the speaker has a particular
authority vis-à-vis his state, and von Savigny (following Wittgenstein) wants
to call such utterances “avowals” (Äusserungen). According to von Savigny,
Wittgenstein considers two possibilities for how such utterances achieve a
role in a language-game. The first is his well-known idea that they can
replace non-verbal behaviour (for instance in the process of language learn-
ing). Thus the utterance “I am in pain” can play the same role as a non-ver-
bal expression of pain: getting hurt is recognized as a precondition whereby
crying out (or uttering “I’m in pain”) has a claim to be answered by com-
forting. 
The second possibility concerns cases where there is no antecedent non-
verbal expressive behaviour. In this case, the expressive behaviour begins with
verbal behaviour. Von Savigny’s example is from § 270: if a person has learnt
to announce correctly a rise in his blood pressure without the help of any
device, his avowal “My blood pressure is rising” will be sufficient to allow
the use of this utterance to some practical end. Here again we find the same
scheme: preconditions, avowal, and practical consequences. The precondi-
tion is of course that the speaker has a history of correct announcements of
his blood pressure. In that case, the meaning of the utterance is determined
by the scheme which constitutes the generally accepted understanding of
the utterance. 
This, von Savigny claims, has stunning consequences: anyone who
expresses a mental state under the right circumstances feels the way he says.
Thus if someone says “I am imagining the colour red”, his imagining of the
colour red is determined by the generally accepted understanding of the utterance.
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This sounds stunning indeed, but von Savigny argues for the view by noting
that it is not enough for the speaker actually to imagine the colour red, since
statements about imagination are not reports, but avowals. Therefore the
right circumstances of the utterance contain above all mastery of “the lan-
guage-game of utterances of imagination”. Thus what determines that one
imagines the colour red is one’s having learnt to operate with such utter-
ances, not the activity of “looking inside oneself ”. 
 Von Savigny goes on to say that a mental state does not of course have to
be expressed linguistically; however, it is still determined (as regards its con-
tent) by the generally accepted understanding of an avowal by means of
which it could be expressed. For instance, “expecting someone to come” can
be expressed extra-linguistically (by walking up and down the room, look-
ing at the clock, etc.), but the content of this state is determined by the gen-
erally accepted understanding of an utterance that can be used to express
that state, e.g. “I expect he’ll come in” (§ 444). Thus we should see the
extra-linguistic expressive behaviour as performing the same role as the lin-
guistic behaviour, von Savigny says; what it expresses depends, once again,
on the generally accepted way in which it is reacted to. 
These remarks, von Savigny claims, are Wittgenstein’s way of explaining
how awovals can come to carry linguistic meaning. This picture can then be
extended to the meaning of extra-linguistic behaviour, expressing some-
thing mental that could (but does not have to) be expressed verbally. Von
Savigny admits that we do not have to read the relevant remarks in the Inves-
tigation in this way, but thinks this a plausible interpretation. 
Thus the mental, von Savigny says, is public for Wittgenstein in a much
more radical sense than is usually assumed. The mental is not just publicly
accessible; it is as directly perceivable as behaviour, and is moreover deter-
mined by this public character. To take an example: the physiological condi-
tion of a sick person is by no means determined by a social (or public)
definition; however, for a person to be sick it is necessary to have a “social
definition of illness” that constitutes this physiological state as sufficient justi-
fication for the person to be cared for. Von Savigny says that these “socially
established reactions” to non-verbal expressive behaviour may largely be
innate (he also talks about reactions depending causally on expressive behav-
iour). He does not, however, take up Wittgenstein’s problematic notion of
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“primitive reactions”, nor does he address the question of how to under-
stand that appeal to “primitivity”. 
Instead he calls attention to the fact that his interpretation of “Wittgen-
stein’s picture of mental facts” was prefigured in Noel Fleming’s “Seeing the
Soul” (1978). In this paper Fleming discusses Wittgenstein’s famous remark
“The human body is the best picture of the human soul” (PI II, p. 178).
Fleming asks what it is for a picture to be a picture, and concludes that
something is a picture if the culture treats it as such: “We can see the storm
in el Greco’s ‘Storm over Toledo’ because it is a norm of our culture to see
the picture as one of a storm”. Thus whichever content a culture sees deter-
mines the content of the picture. However, “seeing as is the same as treating
as”, von Savigny says, and the treating “determines the content of the
expressive behaviour, and with it the mental fact itself ” and thereby “behav-
iour expresses a mental fact when the members of the culture in question
normally treat the person in the way that is appropriate if the mental fact is
the case.” Thus, von Savigny writes, “whoever comforts someone who has
hurt himself and is crying, treats his crying as an expression of pain and the
crying person as someone who is in pain”. It seems clear, he says, that a per-
son who does this in “precisely the circumstances required by the norms of
her culture” sees the other person as someone in pain. The question of how
to establish criteria for “normality” or “the norms of a culture” and thereby
escape circularity is an intricate one, and is not addressed further by von
Savigny here. 
Some of the questions von Savigny takes up, especially the relation between
third-person and first-person psychological utterances, are further addressed
in the next paper, in which Peter Hacker deals with the problem of first-
person utterances and their relation to cognitive claims. Hacker wants to
show that Wittgenstein’s remarks about pain and the impossibility of doubt-
ing that one is in pain constitute an alternative to the “received epistemic
explanation”, which entails that the speaker’s authority with regard to utter-
ances of the type “I am in pain” is constituted by his having direct and priv-
ileged access to the contents of his consciousness and such that he can be
said to know that things are thus-and-so with him. Hacker argues that Witt-
genstein proposed a grammatical elucidation to replace this view, which
means that he sought to describe the grammar of first-person utterances, i.e.
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features of their use and their compatibility with other assertions, epistemic
operators, etc., in order not only to criticize, but also to formulate an alter-
native we can think of as taking the place of the “received epistemic expla-
nation”. 
What will such a grammatical elucidation reveal? First, Hacker argues, we
must distinguish between different cases of first-person psychological utter-
ances. The special status of the case of pain derives from the relation of ver-
bal expressive behaviour (uttering “I am in pain”) to different kinds of
primitive or natural expressive behaviour. In the case of something like pain,
we commonly have to deal not with reports or descriptive utterances, but
with avowals or expressive utterances which “arise from primitive language
games”. However, in other cases, Hacker tells us, for example in the case of
thought, belief, expectation etc., the first-person utterance is not “grafted
onto” natural expressive behaviour, but rather onto linguistic behaviour, i.e.
the use of assertoric sentences. Hacker also thinks that in Wittgenstein’s
view the very term “first-person authority” is misleading in the case of pain,
since it implies a cognitive authority. Instead, what we are dealing with here
is “verdictive” or “executive” authority. 
Hacker thinks Wittgenstein’s views on these matters have frequently been
misunderstood and have not won much support, partly because they have
been misrepresented (e.g. commentators have unjustifiably extrapolated
from avowals of pain to other avowals, and confused categorially different
cases of knowledge). Therefore Hacker thinks we should elaborate Wittgen-
stein’s arguments and his rejection of the cognitive assumptions as an expla-
nation of so-called first-person authority. In order to evaluate the plausibility
of the cognitive assumption Hacker first seeks to elucidate the “contours” of
the concept of knowledge and say something of its relation to adjacent con-
cepts in the semantic field. Subsequently, he examines the rather special case
of pain. 
 Instead of attempting to define “knowledge”, Hacker draws on Witt-
genstein to clarify certain aspects of the use of the verb “to know”. This
clarification proceeds by describing the fundamental kinds of contexts or
“basic language-games” in which the term “know” is “at home” (cf. PI
§ 116). This description suggests that primacy should be given not to states
of mind or dispositions but to the ability (or inability) to answer questions,
the need to find or impart information, to understand and predict actions,
46 | Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works
to repress doubt, etc. In these contexts there are needs in relation to which
the epistemic operator has a standard use, and this excludes the base “I am in
pain”. 
Furthermore, Hacker argues that we should not compare the application
of epistemic operators to psychological propositions with their application
to “categorially distinct” kinds of knowledge, such as mathematical and log-
ical propositions, where doubt is also excluded. Neither should they be
compared to “the class of propositions that are part of one’s world-picture”
(e.g. “The world has existed for a long time”). Instead, what is of relevance
here are contingent empirical propositions, and their “comparison class” is
other psychological propositions. I.e. we should compare the problematic
propositions of the type “I know that I am in pain” with the grammar of
such sentences as “A knows that B is in pain” in order to test the cognitive
account and find the rationale of Wittgenstein’s alternative account. The
result of this comparison, according to Hacker, is that the kinds of needs that
give rise to the use of “I know”, “he knows”, etc. and the kinds of circum-
stances in which such terms might have a legitimate use do not apply in the
case of the subject’s being in pain.
Hacker concludes that although there are possible, legitimate uses for the
form of words “I know I am in pain” (for instance, it might be used as a
joke, an expression of exasperation, an emphasis, etc.), these uses do not
amount to claiming a form of knowledge which is indubitable and derived
from introspection, as the received philosophical view would have it. Such a
view, Hacker argues, is “philosophers’ nonsense”. Nevertheless, Wittgen-
stein’s non-cognitive view goes against the grain of centuries of philosophi-
cal thought, which partly accounts for the difficulties it has had in gaining
acceptance. 
In the last part of his paper Hacker surveys some objections to the non-
cognitive account he has sketched. He thinks that these objections are mis-
taken, and that possible criticism of the non-cognitive account mostly builds
on the assumption that a general account of knowledge is both possible and
necessary, so that we can draw the boundaries of what it makes sense to call
knowledge, and hence enable the exclusion of “anomalies”. However, the
impossibility of defining sufficient and necessary conditions for the use of
“to know” does not mean that we cannot describe features of the grammar
of the concept in different kinds of cases. What has to be accepted is what
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Hacker calls the “logical varieties” of knowledge and what is known, and
the fact that what makes sense in the case of one variety may not make sense
in another. 
It might be interesting to consider Hacker’s paper in terms of Stern’s cat-
egorization of the different approaches to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Clearly,
Hacker’s is a paradigm example of a “non-Pyrrhonian” reading of Wittgen-
stein, in that he understands Wittgenstein’s remarks on “grammar” and “cri-
teria” as substantial doctrines about language and meaning. In contrast to
von Savigny, Hacker does not only claim that this is a possible interpretation
of the text; he also ascribes such a view to Wittgenstein himself by appealing
to the Nachlass and the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. This explic-
itly “non-Pyrrhonian” understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is
further exemplified by Hacker’s claim that Wittgenstein sought to describe
the grammar of first-person utterances not only in order to criticize the
“received cognitive view”, but also to present a substantive, “non-cognitive”
alternative. Thus Hacker says that, since the truth of first-person utterances
about pain is “guaranteed by their truthfulness” (cf. PI II, p. 222), they
function as logical criteria of pain. This criterial status is what the grammatical
description reveals. Hacker’s substantial notion of grammar is made quite
clear by the way he introduces an analogy between rules of a game and the
grammar of “pain”; the possibility of someone being in pain and doubting
(or being certain) that she is in pain is logically excluded – there is no such
thing, “just as there is no such thing as castling in draughts”. So what
Hacker describes, and what he thinks Wittgenstein is after, are the rules of
grammar that account for the “grammatical exclusion of knowledge” in
cases like “I know I am in pain”.
Although “Pyrrhonians” might dispute Hacker’s conclusions, it is difficult to
disagree that both the nature of psychological concepts and the concept of
knowledge are, in one form or another, issues in which Wittgenstein was
keenly interested, especially in his “later” period. Thus the philosophy of
psychology and epistemology are two areas of philosophy where Wittgen-
stein has had at least some influence even outside the circles of “Wittgen-
steinians”, and with regard to these areas it is also possible to argue that his
thoughts amount to a substantial contribution. However, there are other
subjects that Wittgenstein seemed neither to care much about nor to address
48 | Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works
explicitly in his writings, but where he has nonetheless exercised a consider-
able influence, and which could be dealt with in the form of “Wittgenstein
and x”. One such topic is history, which is addressed by Hans-Johann
Glock. 
Analytic philosophy has always been suspicious of or even hostile towards
history of philosophy, and as mentioned at the beginning of our introduc-
tion, the persistent misconception of Wittgenstein as a kind of analytic phi-
losopher has done nothing to weaken a very ahistorical view of his
philosophical work. However, there are some scattered remarks in Wittgen-
stein’s writings that explicitly address both the history of philosophy and the
philosophy of history. These remarks, Glock notes, have been made relevant
by what he calls the “historicist challenge” to analytic philosophy. More-
over, Wittgenstein’s reflections on other topics, such as language and the
nature of philosophy, have inspired historicist arguments, notwithstanding
his personal “historical abstinence” or “historiophobia”. 
Glock explores this tension in his paper. Glock believes there are good
grounds for diagnosing Wittgenstein as “historiophobic”, and he describes
what kind of historiophobia we have to do with. Secondly, he takes a closer
look at the kind of remarks in Wittgenstein’s writings that have been
thought to support historicism vis-à-vis philosophy, and explores their rela-
tion to Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards history. 
Let us first look at Glock’s description of Wittgenstein’s historiophobia.
Wittgenstein shares such a historiophobia with the logical positivists. Indeed,
analytic philosophy is at its very roots characterized by suspicion towards his-
toricism, and this suspicion is coupled with doubts about the very enterprise
traditionally called “philosophy”. Such misgivings can be detected both in
the early Wittgenstein and among the logical positivists whom he influ-
enced. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote that “the whole of philosophy” is
“full of the most fundamental confusions” (3.324), which are grounded in
misunderstandings of the logic of language. The logical positivists’ version of
this criticism of “traditional metaphysics” is well known: they claimed that
most philosophers down through history have dealt with pseudo-proposi-
tions and nonsense, or, in the best case, have tried to deal with philosophical
problems but – lacking the instruments of modern logic (which in some
sense guarantee the scientific nature of the philosophical enterprise) – failed
to reach definite results. However, for the logical positivists the only alterna-
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tive to historicism was naturalism, in the sense that philosophy must be seen
in one way or another as an enterprise continuous with the natural sciences
(which are, in turn, regarded as thoroughly ahistorical). 
Wittgenstein, in contrast, could not be accused of either naturalistic or
analytic historiophobia. Instead, he was always vehemently critical of the
positivistic view of philosophy as something continuous with the natural sci-
ences. However, the alternative to such naturalism, as Glock notes, is not
necessarily to regard philosophy as an essentially “humanistic discipline”, i.e.
as one of the Geisteswissenschaften (and hence inherently historicist). Indeed,
many of the most important philosophers at the beginning of the last cen-
tury perceived philosophy to be threatened equally by naturalism on the one
hand and historicism on the other. This is why thinkers like Frege and Hus-
serl considered it necessary to rethink the nature of philosophy, in some way
that would make it possible to regard philosophy as neither a natural science
nor one of the hermeneutic Geisteswissenschaften. It is in this tradition that
we should also place Wittgenstein and his “historiophobia”. 
Wittgenstein’s belief that his own work constituted a radical break with
the past is clearly evident in the comments he makes about his “new
method” in philosophy in the early 1930s. However, although Wittgenstein
himself avoided the study of other philosophers and cultivated an image of
himself as someone who had read almost no philosophy at all, he did not
explicitly reject the possible study of other philosophers. Although his atti-
tude towards past philosophy ranges, as Glock puts it, “from indifference to
hostility”, he did regard some of the grand metaphysical systems of the past
as “among the noblest productions of the human mind”(as he once told
Drury). Even so, Glock claims that Wittgenstein should still be described as
historiophobic. But the kind of historiophobia we can ascribe to him is nei-
ther naturalistic nor positivistic so much as existentialist; it goes hand in hand
with his contempt for academic philosophy and his inclination, thanks to
the influence of Weininger, towards what Glock calls “the pernicious cult of
genius”, which entails a striving for authenticity and independent thinking.
In addition, he was influenced by several anti-historicist thinkers, such as
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. 
Glock thus identifies a tension in Wittgenstein’s attitude towards philoso-
phy and its history. As we have noted, Wittgenstein did not consider philo-
sophy to be an inherently historicist enterprise. For him its fundamental aim
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was to solve philosophical problems. Seen in this way, philosophy starts not
from the aim to provide a historical understanding of certain problems, but
rather from a sense of wonder or astonishment that is not in itself historically
grounded (a starting point that Wittgenstein shares with Plato and Aristo-
tle). For Glock this also implies that such problems are in some sense a priori,
that is, philosophy is concerned with atemporal concepts and logical struc-
tures, rather than historically changing concepts. Glock identifies this dis-
tinction between questions of validity and questions of historical genesis as
Kantian. In his view, Wittgenstein shares with the Kantian conception the
idea that philosophical problems are a priori in the sense that they have their
root in our “conceptual schemes” rather than in reality. However, since (the
late) Wittgenstein also claimed that language is a human practice and hence
subject to historical change, there seems to be a tension within Wittgen-
stein’s view of philosophy’s relation to its history. This also explains how
Wittgenstein could be an important inspiration to historicist arguments,
especially in the philosophy of science, despite his historiophobia. Thus for
example the work of Feyerabend and Kuhn builds on a Wittgensteinian idea
of meaning as something that depends on practices that are subject to histor-
ical change. However, especially when it comes to the nature of philosophy,
it is debatable what kind of significance such change has. Wittgenstein
sometimes seems to portray philosophy as something historically contin-
gent, while at the same time he seems to hold that most philosophical ques-
tions and problematic concepts are diachronically relatively stable, and so to
speak inherent in language. 
Furthermore, since Wittgenstein’s account of language also seems to con-
tain historicist elements (cf. the analogy between language and an ancient
city, PI § 18), Glock asks whether this should lead to a more historicist
understanding of philosophy, disregarding Wittgenstein’s own vacillations on
the point. Here Glock discusses especially Bernard Williams’ view, accord-
ing to which philosophy’s aim of self-understanding is impossible without
an articulation of the genealogy of our concepts. Glock thinks that the
important idea behind such a view is that the history of philosophy can pro-
vide us with alternatives to our current “framework” of concepts and modes
of thought. This, Glock thinks, is also what Wittgenstein wanted to do: to
show that there are “alternative forms of representation” and thus dispel the
appearance that our current concepts and practices are metaphysically neces-
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sary. But in Glock’s view Wittgenstein also showed that such an investiga-
tion is not necessarily historicist. Wittgenstein stressed the importance of
“the natural history of mankind”, but pointed out that this is not an interest
in history as such, since “we can invent fictitious natural history for our pur-
poses” (PI § 415; II, p. 230). Wittgenstein’s remarks on “natural history”
should, Glock maintains, be distinguished from the kind of “genealogy” that
Williams advocates. Wittgenstein claims, for instance, that it might be philo-
sophically fruitful to investigate how a word is taught. But what matters is
what is taught, not the mechanisms by which we are taught. And, to take an
example that Glock does not mention, Wittgenstein’s remarks on “primitive
reactions” and “pre-linguistic behaviour” need not be understood as a
genetic account of language, but rather as remarks on how such behaviour is
part of our language-games. Thus Glock thinks Wittgenstein does not pro-
vide support for Williams’ argument that the genesis of certain concepts or
beliefs is crucial to their nature and validity. Philosophical explanation, he
argues, must look beyond genetic accounts; what matters is the current role
of the concept. On the other hand, since it is clear that our present “frame-
work” has evolved historically, knowledge of this development might be
helpful in several respects. This applies equally to scientific concepts, and
thus Wittgenstein does provide some support for different historicist
accounts of science and concept formation. 
Summing up, Glock says that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy
and language points towards a minimal version of “moderate historicism”:
knowledge of conceptual history can be helpful, although it is not essential
for philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, did not himself engage in any kind
of historicist study of conceptual change. 
Allan Janik’s paper also places Wittgenstein in relation to the history of phi-
losophy and historicist accounts of science. In addition, Janik takes up a
topic which, like history, Wittgenstein barely mentioned explicitly: the con-
cept of rationality. However, Janik thinks that we can reconstruct a position
on rationality from Wittgenstein’s works, and that this “practice-immanent
conception of rationality” can function as an alternative to two prevalent
conceptions of rationality. Janik identifies these as the “modern” idea that
rationality is essentially bound up with the progress of scientific knowledge,
and the “post-modern” irrationalist view, according to which “anything
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goes”. Janik emphasizes that the Wittgensteinian conception of rationality is
not really a new one – instead, it helps us recover an older, neglected view:
the Aristotelian conception of practical reason or phronesis. Indeed, Janik
thinks that it is with Aristotle’s practical philosophy that “Wittgenstein has
his deepest affinities”. Both Aristotle and Wittgenstein insist that practical
knowledge, which has to do with the ability to judge in a given situation, is
constituted in action and cannot be completely articulated. But in Janik’s
view, Wittgenstein complements Aristotle with his account of rule-follow-
ing, which shows how practical knowledge can be precise and certain yet
still incapable of reduction to a theory. Janik’s attempt to link Wittgenstein’s
“practice immanent” conception of rationality to Aristotle’s does not, he
says, mean that he wants to “turn the philosophical clock backwards”. Nei-
ther does he claim that Wittgenstein was influenced by Aristotle’s thinking.
Instead, he argues that this link can help us appreciate how the idea of “let-
ting practice take care of itself ” (cf. OC § 139) is not some kind of laissez-
faire relativism but instead “a source of order”.
This, Janik argues, can be illustrated by certain aspects of Common Law,
which is based upon the idea that decisions of a higher court have the char-
acter of dicta, i.e. things that “stand fast” for us when we are making other
legal judgements. Furthermore, questions of legality are determined with
reference to circumstances and sound judgement, not to a fixed body of
rules. Janik argues that the kind of reasoning involved here is analogical and
metaphorical rather than formal or subsumptive. Wittgenstein’s later think-
ing about rules, he maintains, builds upon a similar idea of how we learn by
applying knowledge in a variety of new situations by integrating it into that
which “stands fast” for us. In this sense practice is, in Janik’s words, “the
firm basis upon which our capacity to act and ultimately to represent the
world accurately is based”. 
In Janik’s view, however, Wittgenstein does not offer us a “new paradigm
of rationality”, at least not if we take this to mean some kind of philosophi-
cal theory of rationality. Instead, rationality must be seen as a property of
human action, and as such it cannot be captured by general theories, but
only by reflecting on practice. The conclusion of all this is a view of Witt-
genstein’s philosophy as “eminently unheroic”, as bearing no message or
thesis apart from “the insight into the way that our concepts are rooted in
our natural history that dissolves philosophical problems”. “Leaving things as
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they are”, Janik says, means that being a philosopher amounts to “nothing
else than analyzing the unspoken and thus unquestioned foundations of our
enterprises”. This amounts to the “soberingly realistic” thought that it is not
philosophy or thinking, but politics, i.e. action, that can change the world. 
According to Janik, Wittgenstein’s importance in questions concerning
rationality is evident from the fact that he can be considered one of the
“grandfathers” of a “praxis-oriented philosophy of science” since he was
one of the main inspirations behind such historicist views of human ratio-
nality. However, this has also meant that the charges of relativism levelled
against accounts such as that of Kuhn have directly or indirectly been aimed
at Wittgenstein as well, and Janik concludes his paper by discussing “the
Wittgensteinian answer to relativism”. Janik says that one cannot ascribe to
Wittgenstein any kind of strong relativism, which would anyway be self-
refuting. But in his view Wittgenstein does not deny the weak claim that
“there is incommensurability and incompatibility with respect to values in
the world”. This Janik calls “robust relativism”. As an example he mentions
incompatible attitudes to food, for instance the eating of pork. This kind of
“relativism” or incompatibility is just a general fact of our natural history,
and this, he tells us, is a sobering insight since it “reconciles us to facing the
world as it really is”, and shows us the limitations that follow from our being
the creatures we are. Furthermore (and here he agrees with Glock), Janik
thinks that explaining the circumstances that have led to such incompatibil-
ity is a task not for philosophy, but for history or social science. 
In the next contribution Kristóf Nyíri takes up Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
pictures. Here, as in the overall interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy,
the traditional and still predominant view maintains that there is a disconti-
nuity between the early Tractarian picture theory of meaning and the late
philosophy, where Wittgenstein is interpreted as holding a “use theory of
pictures”, according to which pictures themselves do not carry any meaning
except in virtue of their use in specific contexts, and are subservient to
words since those contexts are defined by language. Nyíri challenges this
predominant view, and suggests that the ostensible lack of interest in the
philosophy of pictures in later Wittgenstein is partly due to the fact that the
printed corpus only partially conveys the continuities and changes in Witt-
genstein’s ideas of pictorial representation. The printed corpus also fails to
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convey the later Wittgenstein’s method of using diagrams to make philo-
sophical points, Nyíri claims. This can only be corrected by looking at the
Nachlass, rather than adhering solely to the printed texts.16
Nyíri begins his investigation by taking a look at what kind of “picture of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of pictures” we get from the most important of
the printed later work, i.e. the Investigations, Philosophical Remarks, Philoso-
phical Grammar, and the Blue and Brown Books. Nyíri takes a detailed look at
the passages on pictures contained in these works, and concludes that all
these volumes contain important ideas on e.g. the social function of pic-
tures, pictorial meaning and pictorial communication, but that these ideas
do not “add up to a unified philosophy of pictures”. Indeed, Nyíri contends
that the later Wittgenstein never had such a unified philosophy. However,
Nyíri does suggest that it is possible to construct a “genuine philosophy of
pictures” from Wittgenstein’s scattered insights, but only if we take into
account the entire Nachlass, especially since certain editorial decisions make
it difficult to assess the development of Wittgenstein’s thought on these sub-
jects on the basis of the printed work alone, and since many of his ideas
never made it into the printed editions. 
Nyíri then presents “five samples” that demonstrate how the Bergen Elec-
tronic Edition of the Nachlass can be used in this work. Here he does not
attempt to construct a unified philosophy of pictures, but wants to show that
Wittgenstein’s writings do contain a number of important insights about
pictures and pictorial representations that do not appear in the printed
works. 
The first “sample” deals with a remark from MS 110 (from the early
1930s) about imagination or fantasy (Phantasie), which Wittgenstein says
should be understood as consisting not of a painted picture or a plastic
model but as a complex of words and pictures. Nyíri then shows how Witt-
genstein takes up and reworks this passage at different points between 1930
and 1948, giving it its fullest treatment in the Big Typescript.
16. A point also made by M.R. Biggs; see for example his “Wittgenstein: Graphics, Nor-
mativity and Paradigms”, Arbeiten zu Wittgenstein, ed. W. Krüger and A. Pichler, Work-
ing Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen no. 15 (1998), pp. 8–22.
Biggs’ work has led to revisions of the rendering of Wittgenstein’s graphics in new edi-
tions of the published work, for example PI 1997.
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The second sample, Alles kann, concerns three passages from MS 114
(1933–34). Here Wittgenstein starts by saying that “anything can be a pic-
ture of anything else”. It thus seems that any picture is in need of an expla-
nation of what it is about. However, in the next passage he says that thinking
can be compared to the drawing of pictures. In the third passage he presents
a comprehensive view, similar to the one discussed in the first sample: the
mental comprises both pictures and words. This, Nyíri thinks, represents an
alternative to both “verbalist” (or “propositionalist”) and “imagistic” (or
“pictorialist”) extremism. 
Nyíri’s third example, Philebos, takes up a passage from Plato that Witt-
genstein copied into a notebook in 1931 (MS 111). Once again, Nyíri
thinks that Wittgenstein’s interpretation of this passage shows that he under-
stands the mental in terms of involving both words and images, and that he
contrasts this with Plato’s “one-sided approach”; Plato amply discusses the
mental in terms of abstract notions, whereas the idea of picturing is men-
tioned only to be more or less ignored. 
Nyíri notes that Wittgenstein makes the same point in MS 159 (1938),
i.e. that the mental, in this case memories, consists of pictures and words.
Nyíri dubs this passage Schlinge. Here Wittgenstein discusses the symbolism
of the “speech bubble”. This, Nyíri thinks, is connected with the problem
of the emergence of pictorial conventions; the speech bubble functions as a
natural sign, though it is clearly conventional. 
Nyíri’s last sample, Kinemat, focuses on a remark in MS 118 (1937),
where Wittgenstein suggests that the proof of 3+2=5 could be represented
“cinematographically”, by a kind of animation which would represent a
series of different constellations of five dots. The proof could then be
thought of as a dynamic pictorial representation. Wittgenstein also uses the
idea of “cinematographic pictures” in several other connections, as Nyíri
points out. For example, he seems to suggest that turning a static picture
into an animated one can sometimes disambiguate it. On the other hand,
this does not mean that animated pictures in themselves are unambiguous.
Nyíri concedes that it is not always entirely clear what Wittgenstein intends
this analogy to convey, but still thinks the point is important, and one that
does not surface in Wittgenstein’s printed writings. 
Summing up his paper, Nyíri arrives at some challenging conclusions.
He thinks that reflections on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of pictures make us
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aware that he was, in his later work, trying to liberate himself from the influ-
ence of written language upon philosophy, and that his later philosophy can
usefully be interpreted as “a philosophy of post-literacy”. Nyíri claims that
Wittgenstein was attempting to overcome “the barriers of verbal language
by working towards a philosophy of pictures”. It was precisely “written lan-
guage as a source of philosophical confusion that was Wittgenstein’s foe”.
Furthermore, he maintains that Wittgenstein himself was not clearly aware
of this, “perhaps since his insights were made possible, to some extent at
least, by dyslexia”. 
Nyíri’s paper takes up some passages that we do not find in the printed work
but which are now available through the electronic edition of the Nachlass.
In the next paper, Antonia Soulez approaches a collection of texts that has
only recently been made available, and the status of which within Wittgen-
stein’s corpus is somewhat unclear. The texts in question are Waismann’s
typescripts of dictations and discussions with Schlick and Wittgenstein dat-
ing from the early 1930s, which were recently edited and published by the
late Gordon Baker.17 Technically speaking the author here is Waismann;
these texts are not from Wittgenstein’s own hand, and it is often difficult, as
Baker points out, to know whether they are verbatim dictations from Witt-
genstein or Waismann’s attempts to record Wittgenstein’s ideas in his own
words. This is why on the title page Baker gives both Waismann and Witt-
genstein as the authors, and it also explains Baker’s title for the collection,
The Voices of Wittgenstein. It is this kind of Unbestimmtheit about “who is
speaking” that Soulez takes as her point of departure. 
Soulez claims that the text “Rot und Grün” offers an early example of a
polyphonic dialogism that Wittgenstein uses later, especially in the Investiga-
tions. She thinks that the text in question displays a “musical” structure,
involving three or four different and competing voices, representing differ-
ent philosophical stances, none of which can be identified with the author,
or “Wittgenstein”. In this fashion, different philosophical stances to the
17. Fr. Waismann and L. Wittgenstein: The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle, origi-
nal German texts and English translations, transcribed, edited and with an introduction
by G. Baker, transl. by G. Baker, M. Mackert, J. Connolly and V. Politis (London:
Routledge, 2003).
Introduction | 57
impossibility of “red and green in the same place” are displayed in a sort of
Bakhtinian polyphony. Soulez distinguishes different “conceptual charac-
ters” in the text, representing different Denkstile, which she identifies as the
voices of the Millian empiricist (according to whom the question must be
settled by appeal to experience), the Husserlian phenomenologist (to whom
the impossibility is grounded in the nature or essence of colour), and the
“grammarian” (who says that the question can be dissolved by noting that
we are dealing with different uses of words). 
During the dialogue the voice of the grammarian splits into the Schlick-
ian “ostensive grammarian” (who claims that the impossibility derives from
the meanings of words, fixed by ostensive definition), and the “we our-
selves”, who advocates a “grammatical freedom” and thinks that the ques-
tion can be dissolved by showing that rules for the use of words can be
constructed (using different analogies) in such a way that red and green can
indeed be said to be in the same place, but under different aspects. At this
point it might be tempting to identify the “non-Schlickian” grammarian
with Wittgenstein himself, but Soulez maintains that none of these stand-
points has any privilege over any other, and that the “we” should not be
identified with Wittgenstein, since “grammar is not a standpoint”. Instead,
the grammarian’s standpoint is parasitic; he is describing different stand-
points without advocating or endorsing any of them. Soulez maintains that
this can be understood as a kind of “therapeutic” method, which consists in
comparing systems of expression with each other. This method can in turn
be compared with “a rivalry of voices within a divided, but not dissociated,
self ”. 
Soulez concludes her paper by comparing this polyphonic dissonance, or
rivalry and disagreement, which does not issue in a single, unified view,
with Stanley Cavell’s ideas about “attunement” and agreement as the basis of
sharing criteria and hence of rationality. She claims that such a dissonant
polyphony between philosophical voices is at odds with Cavell’s insistence
on a “Kantian agreement in judgement”, and that the dialogism displayed in
the dictation on “red and green” excludes all sorts of consensus, and might
therefore constitute a “threat to rationalism grounded upon attunement”.
However, as Soulez herself notes, what Cavell is talking about is the dis-
agreement not between philosophers, but between the philosopher and
ordinary uses of language. Thus the conflict between such a use of philo-
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sophical polyphony and the Cavellian insistence upon “agreement in judge-
ments” as a response to scepticism might not be as acute as it appears. Cavell
would probably say that we should think that Wittgensteinian dialogism or
polyphony, by displaying disagreements between philosophical stances, can
be used to highlight conflicts between the philosopher and ordinary uses of
language.
Soulez’s paper emphasizes the importance of the “voice” and the literary
qualities of Wittgenstein’s work. Brian McGuinness explores this theme fur-
ther and argues that it is essential when we read Wittgenstein to realize that
“the important thing is not the facts but the way the facts are regarded or
presented”. In other words, to understand Wittgenstein we must pay due
regard to the literary character of his writing. Already in the Tractatus this lit-
erary character is obvious, and Wittgenstein famously underlined it in his
letter to von Ficker, where he emphasized that the book is “strictly philo-
sophical but at the same time literary”. According to McGuinness, some of
the difficulties encountered in interpreting the Tractatus come from the fail-
ure to accept this possibility; it is common to think, like Frege, that an
“artistic achievement” cannot constitute a contribution to philosophy. By
contrast, McGuinness argues that the literary irony of the Tractatus is part
and parcel of its philosophical message. For instance, Wittgenstein claims
that everything that can be said can be said clearly, while at the same time
maintaining that nobody will understand his work. The main irony of the
Tractatus is, of course, that its results are said to be unspeakable. This irony is
reflected in the book’s motto, which says that everything we really know can
be said in a couple of words. Indeed, the very form of the Tractatus can be
seen as a parody of a mathematical treatise; it piles definition upon definition
(which the reader soon realizes are circular), only to point out that such
definitions are impossible. The Tractatus, McGuinness concludes, is “always
hinting at or indicating the opposite of what it says”. The aim of this irony
is, he claims, clarificatory: “to recreate confusion and then dispel it”. Even
the original title Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung can be understood as con-
taining an ironical point (noted by Wittgenstein himself in a notebook from
1937, MS 157b); in the Tractatus, logic and philosophy are abgehandelt, i.e.
traded away or sold off by showing that logic is universal while its propo-
sitions say nothing. However, since the literary form of the Tractatus is
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inherently misleading, McGuinness argues that in his later philosophy Witt-
genstein had to find a new approach or “voice” in which to pursue his clari-
ficatory aim. 
What then does the turn from “early” to “late” philosophy mean?
According to McGuinness, the emphasis on the continuity of Wittgenstein’s
thought (to which he himself has wanted to call attention) sometimes tends
to downplay important differences between the “early” and “late” philoso-
phy. He thinks there is a big difference between the two, namely Wittgen-
stein’s explicit abandonment of a kind of dogmatism that characterised his
early work. McGuinness believes that this move from dogmatism and all
kind of philosophical speculation was inspired by Sraffa, and “executed with
tools derived from Spengler”. Furthermore, it required Wittgenstein to turn
his back on the “bourgeois philosophy” of Ramsey. From Spengler Witt-
genstein picked up the idea of the family, and from Sraffa the realization that
understanding is not a “pneumatic” process (i.e. that there is no need for
some structure upon which meaning and understanding depend), both piv-
otal for his later philosophy. McGuinness sums up these main insights by
saying that they amounted to the realization that there was not “one system
that we have to respect and shore up but lots of different rulebooks towards
which we have different attitudes and reactions”; we should give up striving
for generality and instead pay attention to particular cases. Thus this change,
according to McGuinness, involved a further “Abhandlung” of logic: from
being absolute (albeit without content), to being understood as a form we
apply more or less loosely to areas of our language.
A kind of literary irony can also be found in Wittgenstein’s later work,
though it takes a different form. McGuinness points for example to the
motto of the Investigations, which says that progress always looks greater than
it really is. This obviously refers to modern ideas of progress, but might
equally be taken to refer to the progress that Wittgenstein’s own book
apparently makes. In his text Wittgenstein frequently uses irony, similes,
analogies and other literary devices. To take one example (not from
McGuinness but from Hertzberg’s paper): the builders’ game at the very
beginning of the Investigations, which can be viewed as an example of what
one could call “Wittgensteinian irony”. Here Wittgenstein responds to a
general account (Augustine’s about language) by offering not a counter-
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example but a case where it does indeed seem to fit, and this encourages the
reader to realize how special that case is. 
What, then, is the relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophical aims and
the form in which he expressed his results in the “later” philosophy?
McGuinness thinks (like McGinn, Diamond, and Conant) that both the
Investigations and the Tractatus have a clarificatory aim but that the form of
the Tractatus is misleading and prevents the achievement of this aim. This is
why Wittgenstein needed a new approach, and this is the dialogic form of
the Investigations. This form was appropriate for his non-dogmatic philoso-
phy; the aim is, again, clarification by “a certain amount of recreating con-
fusion in order to dispel it”. For Wittgenstein, the proper way to do this was
always face to face communication, where the way a thing is said, and the
process of thinking that has gone into what is being said, are visible. The
dialogue form can convey this better than a prose treatise, although in the
last instance, McGuinness claims, the Investigations, like Plato’s Phaedrus, is an
attempt to show in a book that nothing can properly be shown in a book.
Instead, the reader must himself attempt to do the same work that is being
sketched in the text. This, finally, is what the “literary character” amounts
to. We must be able to reformulate what Wittgenstein says, not just repeat it;
but this is precisely what we cannot do without due regard for the character
of his writing. 
McGuinness’ essay introduces us to the theme of the final set of papers,
which deal with Wittgenstein’s work in a very concrete sense, that is, the
actual physical writing that he produced, and the editing of those writings.
As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, this is arguably an
aspect of Wittgenstein scholarship that does not always get due attention.
“Works” in the title of this volume is intentionally ambiguous. According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, “work” means (among other things) “what
a person has or had to do”, or “a literary or musical composition (viewed in
relation to its author or composer)”. In Wittgenstein’s case it is precisely the
relation between what Wittgenstein the philosopher did and the concrete
results of that activity that is at issue. How are we to deal with the fact that
during his lifetime he did not publish much more than one short book and
a modest paper, while leaving a Nachlass of some 20,000 pages of manu-
scripts, and that a very significant number of “works” have been culled from
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this Nachlass and published posthumously in his name, including what is
arguably one of the most important and influential works of philosophy of
the 20th century, viz. the Philosophical Investigations? It is obvious that we
have to answer, or at least think through, these questions before we can even
begin to talk about Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy as opposed to “Witt-
gensteinian” philosophy. 
The problems that confront us are not merely of a practical nature; when
we reflect on the philosophical work of Wittgenstein the very notions of
“work”, “text”, “writing” and “publication” turn out to be problematic.
Furthermore, the conceptual problems that confront us here arise not just in
the case of Wittgenstein, but are endemic to the relationship between “phi-
losophy” (or “thought”) and “work”. However, in Wittgenstein’s case the
specific problems concerning his literary estate and its relation to his think-
ing make these questions unavoidable. The final papers in this collection
address these issues from a variety of angles. 
In the first of them, Sir Anthony Kenny surveys the troubled history of
Wittgenstein publishing. In his will Wittgenstein bequeathed the copyright
to his manuscripts and typescripts to R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe and
G.H. von Wright. In his will he also stated that these heirs were to publish
“as many of my unpublished writings as they think fit”. However, as men-
tioned above, it was up to the literary executors to decide what should
count as publishable works among these writings. Should everything Witt-
genstein ever wrote be treated on an equal level? If not, how are we to
establish which texts should be treated as “canonical”? And should these
(and only these) be published as critical editions in book form? This contro-
versy begins already with the posthumous publication of the Investigations in
1953. In the “editors’ note” to this work Anscombe and Rhees concede
that “if Wittgenstein had published his work himself, he would have sup-
pressed a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or so of Part I and
worked what is in Part II, with further material, into its place”. Kenny
thinks that the edition of the first part of the Investigations is “basically
sound”. However, the inclusion of MS 144 as a second part is much more
controversial since it was decided by the editors without any documented
warrant from Wittgenstein. Many of the other publications of Wittgenstein’s
work reflect editorial choices still more clearly. Kenny points out that Witt-
genstein’s literary executors did an invaluable job in making available and
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having translated parts of his manuscript material, but he also reminds that
these posthumous publications were of course never sanctioned by Wittgen-
stein himself, and that it is not clear that we can actually distinguish “works”
in the Nachlass corresponding to the publications. 
The circumstances surrounding Wittgenstein’s Nachlass soon made its sta-
tus controversial. Since the manuscript material was not publicly available,
the publishing activity was surrounded by a certain amount of mystification
and hush-hush, which even involved rumours of censorship and arbitrari-
ness. In 1967 the parts of the Nachlass then known to exist were micro-
filmed by the executors for Cornell University, thus becoming available to
researchers. However, the reproductions were of uneven quality, the collec-
tion was incomplete, and parts of the manuscripts, in particular the coded
passages, were omitted or covered over, all of which only helped to fuel the
rumours surrounding the Nachlass. Even so, von Wright thought at the time
that once the publications that were available by the end of the 60s had been
supplemented with the Big Typescript (TS 213) and On Certainty, “the full
body of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” would be available to the public.18 
Kenny thinks this marked the end of the first era of Wittgenstein recep-
tion, and it did indeed mean that the essential texts were available. But the
publication of the Big Typescript under the title Philosophische Grammatik in
1970 was controversial. Rhees’ edition has encountered much criticism (for
instance, Nyíri in his paper calls it “a mis-edited aggregate of various sepa-
rate, unfinished texts”). Kenny thinks this criticism is partly unwarranted.
Rhees’ Philosophical Grammar is, he says, “only one of many possible order-
ings of Wittgenstein’s passages”, but that does not make it wrong per se.
What is problematic is that Rhees hardly indicated the editorial decisions
behind the publication.19 
By the mid-70s it was felt that a new edition of the Nachlass was needed,
partly because of the discovery of additional manuscripts. But there was also
an increasing realization that Wittgenstein’s texts, as Kenny puts it, “pre-
sented problems almost without parallels among 20th century writers”.
18. For comprehensive and detailed lists of sources for publications from the Nachlass, see
M. Biggs and A. Pichler: “Wittgenstein: Two Source Catalogues and a Bibliography”,
Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen no. 7 (1992), now
available on http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wp-no7.pdf (accessed June 1st, 2006).
Introduction | 63
Wittgenstein’s practice of incessantly rewriting, correcting, and rearranging
his texts makes it extremely difficult to assemble his manuscripts into com-
plete and finished philosophical works. As Kenny points out, the text often
exists on several levels, as in the case of the Big Typescript: notebooks, dif-
ferent manuscripts, revised typescripts, which were then cut up and rear-
ranged several times, etc. 
In 1977 a conference on the future of the publication of the Nachlass was
held in Tübingen. Because of the nature of the material it was decided that
a necessary first step was to establish a computerized database of the
Nachlass. It was hoped that by the mid 80s this would result in a printed
Gesamtausgabe (consisting of some fourteen volumes of about 500 pages
each). But although this first attempt succeeded in transcribing almost half
the Nachlass, it eventually floundered, and the task was taken up by two sep-
arate undertakings: Michael Nedo’s project in Cambridge, and the Norwe-
gian Wittgenstein Project. Kenny gives a detailed account of the develop-
ment of these projects. By the early 90s, Nedo’s project had failed to
produce published results. However, it is since 1993 in the process of releas-
ing the so-called Wiener Ausgabe (published by Springer). The Norwegian
Wittgenstein Project, on the other hand, transcribed about 3,000 pages, but
had to be aborted because sufficient clearance from the executors had not
been obtained. However, at the end of the 80s a new Norwegian project
under the leadership of Claus Huitfeldt was started in the form of the Witt-
genstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB). This project was suc-
cessful and led, inter alia, to the publication of an electronic edition of the
Nachlass.
With the so-called Bergen Electronic Edition the entire Nachlass is now
available to scholars. At the end of his paper Kenny turns to the question of
whether and what parts of it should be published as printed works, and in
what form. He concludes that a Gesamtausgabe in hard copy is probably
19. Much of the criticism of Rhees’ edition is indeed exaggerated. Rhees himself argues
for his decisions in R. Rhees, “On editing Wittgenstein”, ed. and introduced by D.Z.
Phillips, Philosophical Investigations 19 (1996), pp. 55–61. Phillips justly points out in the
introduction: “What cannot be sustained is the view that there is only one conception
of editing, so obvious that it can be taken for granted, and that Rhees (sharing this
conception, since there is no alternative) ignored its elementary requirements.”
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unrealistic. We have certain models of critical texts (e.g. Schulte’s critical-
genetic edition of the Investigations), but Kenny thinks that the very nature
of Wittgenstein’s texts actually makes it more suitable to study the Nachlass
in electronic form. He also thinks that a translation into English of the com-
plete Nachlass is out of the question, since proper study of it demands com-
parisons between variants and revisions and can only be undertaken
profitably by scholars who understand German. Even so, he thinks that a
revision of the existing English translations, despite their current high qual-
ity, could indeed be undertaken. 
In the next paper, Joachim Schulte addresses the fundamental question
already broached by Kenny: “What is a work by Wittgenstein?” Questions
relating to textual criticism and the very categories of “work” and “publica-
tion” by Wittgenstein have, as Kenny noted, become increasingly relevant
with the electronic publication of the Nachlass. Schulte points out that this
event has put readers in a position to criticize the existing editions of Witt-
genstein’s writings. Confronted with the seemingly impenetrable bulk of the
Nachlass, many readers have felt that it is only this totality of papers that can
be properly regarded as Wittgenstein’s work and that it cannot be divided
into chunks called “works”. This attitude, Schulte claims, is completely mis-
guided. On the other hand, it is not at all clear what parts of the Nachlass
can be called works. Schulte argues that before we can even attempt an
answer to this question, we must understand Wittgenstein’s peculiar way of
working, i.e. what Schulte calls his “Bemerkungen style of writing”. Wittgen-
stein wrote down fairly short remarks (usually not exceeding half a page in a
notebook). These remarks, Schulte points out, are not to be regarded as self-
contained aphorisms, since they are not independent of the remarks sur-
rounding them. Wittgenstein put an immense amount of work into rear-
ranging this material in accordance with whatever overall project he was
occupied with at any one time. Because of this working method the
Nachlass cannot be viewed as one enormous “hypertext” of interconnected
and criss-crossing remarks. 
But how are we to decide which parts to accept as “works”? Schulte dis-
tinguishes three criteria that we might use in trying to figure out whether a
certain manuscript or typescript is to count as a “work” by Wittgenstein.
Introduction | 65
These are neither necessary nor sufficient criteria, but function as rules of
thumb. 
a. The author himself thought that the text in question formed a whole.
b. The readers can detect a line of argument, an interesting set of ques-
tions, objections and replies.
c. The text has undergone a certain amount of stylistic polishing and rear-
ranging in order to improve readability and intelligibility.
What emerges when we try to assess Wittgenstein’s published texts accord-
ing to these criteria? According to Schulte, very little other than Part I of
the Philosophical Investigations comes close to the status of a work, and even
where Part I of the Investigations is concerned, there are big differences
between the various sections. In fact, Schulte claims that only §§ 1–188 can
be said quite uncontroversially to fulfil all three criteria. However, the Inves-
tigations (Part I) as a whole is the closest we come to a “work” among all
post-Tractatus texts. Schulte points out that this does not mean the editors
were wrong to choose the texts they did for publication, since the texts that
have been published are those that come nearest to fulfilling the criteria for
being “works”, even though “very little comes near that status” except for
the Investigations. As a case in point Schulte takes On Certainty. He thinks
that here criteria a) and c) are clearly not satisfied. However, criterion b)
might lead us to think of this as a coherent “work”. Schulte concludes that
it is perhaps b) that is ultimately the most important criterion. These crite-
ria, as Schulte makes clear, do not constitute a definition of “work”, but
they can be used to prompt the reader to reflect on whether or not a partic-
ular text or edition of Wittgenstein’s writings is or is not to be approached as
a “work”.
Both Schulte and Kenny emphasize the importance of the fact that we now
have Wittgenstein’s Nachlass available in electronic form, as both facsimiles
and transcriptions. In the next paper, Herbert Hrachovec gives an evaluation
of the Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE) and its use in relation to the socio-eco-
nomics of computer-assisted scholarship. He begins by noting “an anomaly”
in current Wittgenstein scholarship: although the BEE has been available for
several years, very few recent publications on Wittgenstein make use of it or
even mention it.20 There are two easy explanations for this, he says. One is
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that Wittgenstein scholars are used to using printed material, the other is
that the overwhelming part of the Nachlass is available in German only. But
he also thinks there are some shortcomings in the BEE that explain why it
has received so little recognition. For instance, there are problems with net-
worked sharing of the database. Many of these problems have to do with the
software used as a platform for the edition: Folio Views. Hrachovec regards
this program as a “straightjacket” that restricts how the user can access the
database. There are also many functional problems associated with the soft-
ware, especially if the user wants to extract text from the database. The MS-
Windows environment is another potentially restrictive factor, since it leaves
the database at the mercy of market forces. Another problem is the numeri-
cal ordering of Nachlass items according to the von Wright catalogue, since
the numerical sequence does not coincide with their chronology, and the
design of the Folio Views “infobase” makes it difficult for the user to rear-
range the order. 
These are issues that directly concern the conditions of electronic pub-
lishing. Electronic publishing and digital editing should not, Hrachovec says,
aim at “books in digital disguise” (especially not when what is edited are not
themselves books, but manuscripts). So what are the alternatives? In the sec-
ond part of his paper Hrachovec discusses the alternative possibility of using
a markup language that does not presuppose any specific platform. Indeed,
the transcriptions underlying the Bergen edition were originally encoded in
such a markup language, “MECS-WIT”, which was developed by the
Wittgenstein Archives especially for this purpose.21 Like markup languages
in general, MECS-WIT captures philological content in meta-tags, and is
neutral as regards presentation software. As Hrachovec points out, this kind
of solution makes it possible to “preserve the autonomy of scholarship
against the flux of digital consumer economy”. Of course there must be a
software bridge between the markup language and programs that achieve a
user-friendly interface on the machines we actually use, but Hrachovec’s
20. Hrachovec refers to the situation in 2001.
21. MECS-WIT implements a syntax called MECS (“Multi Element Code System”),
which was developed by Claus Huitfeldt; on MECS, see further
http://gandalf.aksis.uib.no/claus/mecs/mecs.htm (accessed June 1st, 2006).
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point is that it should be possible for the user to choose and exchange this
software according to need, advances in available programs, and so on. 
Hrachovec thinks that XML provides a promising markup language. The
advantage of XML is that it is only minimally dependent upon the specifics
of particular hardware or software, so the user can choose her own way of
processing the data. Hrachovec admits that this is probably not something
which the average reader of the Nachlass could be expected to handle, and
that something more “ready-to-use” like the present Bergen CD edition is
needed. Hrachovec’s aim is ultimately “a broader vision of digital transcrip-
tion”, and to this end he regards the use of a platform-independent markup
language such as XML as crucial. The underlying material, in this case
Wittgenstein’s original sequence of remarks, could then be accessed in vari-
ous ways, and guidance to the different possible structures could be given
without interfering with the original text.
Hrachovec points out that the electronic structural analysis made possible
by digital publishing opens up avenues that were hitherto unavailable. It is
open to peer review; it also allows the inclusion of a range of proposals for
how the remarks could be structured, which could be run parallel to com-
mentaries and linked to further texts containing secondary information. 
As a number of writers have noted, Wittgenstein’s texts have a certain
musical character in virtue of their frequent repetitions, inversions, thematic
variations and the like. Some of this is difficult to appreciate or follow in
printed form. Hrachovec concludes that the fluidity of Wittgenstein’s
thought as reflected in the Nachlass is not well served when subjected to the
restrictions of traditional media, whether this be the book form or the form
of databases bound to specific platforms. The ongoing activity of philoso-
phical research and the nature of Wittgenstein’s writings call for a more
dynamic approach, which is indeed an inherent possibility in digitalization.
In the last paper of our collection, Cameron McEwen takes up the lead from
Hrachovec and surveys some of the prospects for the future of Wittgenstein
publishing and digital publishing more generally. Like Hrachovec, McEwen
thinks Wittgenstein’s “complex and multi-layered” style of thought “can be
presented in digital form in ways that are difficult or impossible in print”.
Wittgenstein’s thought, he argues, is in a form that corresponds to a crucial
junction between print and digital media, and this makes it an excellent
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“test case” or model for electronic humanities scholarship. This point is
strengthened by the fact that Wittgenstein scholarship has already made
greater use of digital research and publishing than work on any other philo-
sopher. 
McEwen starts by summing up the state of the art of electronic editing
and digital publishing in philosophy. He then presents an ongoing project
that aims to build a “research platform” for Wittgenstein scholarship that
will allow the cross-searching of original and translated works, papers, con-
versations, lectures, etc., together with secondary sources such as journal
articles, conference proceedings and the like, and even language dictionar-
ies. In the future, this could be complemented with a database containing
complete texts of seminal authors that influenced Wittgenstein, e.g.
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Hertz, Weininger, Boltzmann, Spengler, Frege,
Sraffa, etc. McEwen notes that most of the components for this Wittgen-
stein platform are already in place. The problems that remain have to do
partly with copyright issues, and partly with the lack of funding in the
humanities for the development of such digital tools. 
What, then, are the implications of such a development for Wittgenstein
research, or indeed, humanistic research more generally? Despite the slow
start in the humanities, due to scholars being raised into and accustomed to
a book culture, McEwen is optimistic about the future of digital research in
the humanities in general and in Wittgenstein scholarship in particular.
Indeed, he thinks recent developments will inevitably lead to a revolution in
the very nature of scholarly work. The development of databases that allow
new kinds of access and search does not in itself, he says, amount to a star-
tling change in scholarship. But he thinks we can already glimpse a second
stage on the horizon. Taking the recent Innsbruck electronic edition of
Wittgenstein’s Gesamtbriefwechsel22 as an example, he notes that this second
stage includes electronic editing of the digitalized material. This kind of
editing identifies references which are then set out with jump links to other
texts or databases (for instance, in Wittgenstein’s case such links can lead
22. Wittgenstein’s collected correspondence, edited under the auspices of the Brenner
Archives Research Institute (University of Innsbruck) by M. Seekircher, B. McGuin-
ness and A. Unterkircher, published by Intelex in CD and network versions (2004).
The project currently includes about 2300 items of correspondence.
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from a passage to annotations regarding chronology, geographical place, bio-
graphical information on people mentioned, related texts, passages in the
Nachlass, and so on). This might not sound very startling, but McEwen
claims such editing will in fact revolutionize research in the humanities,
since it can build expert knowledge into the presentation of texts. To begin
with, he thinks such contributions will differ from the lectures, journal arti-
cles, and books we are used to from a “print environment”. These contribu-
tions will be linked to specific passages, e.g., in the Wittgensteinian corpus,
and hence “made in a much more concise and focused way”, and this in
turn will reduce the emphasis on “the sort of literary exposition which is
required in lectures and articles”. 
In such a way, McEwen predicts, humanities research will come closer to
research in the natural sciences, in the sense that being a researcher will
mean first and foremost “knowing how to participate in the further investi-
gation, or applied use, or teaching”, of existing knowledge. As in the natural
sciences, “a network of accepted results and known uncertain areas serves to
define the field.” This kind of research is inevitably a collective undertaking.
According to McEwen, what will probably happen is that a networked
group of researchers will edit and annotate the entire Wittgenstein corpus.
Annotations, commentaries (and commentaries upon commentaries, and so
on), as well as other kinds of text passages will then be fitted into this corpus
and set out by jump notes marked by icons. He thinks that in principle there
is no limit “to the amount of annotation and disagreement which might be
recorded”. However, the main problem in that case will be how to keep this
kind of project useful and manageable, and McEwen admits that perhaps the
most important issue here is how to organize and index the growing mass of
material in a useful way. In this context “useful” means “organized in a
coherent manner, but open to modification in ways which are neither
merely wilful nor subject to unreasonable (authoritarian, bureaucratic, con-
nection-dependent, etc.) barriers”. 
In open source software projects, which constitute a model for this kind
of collaborative, collective effort in the digital world, the usefulness of differ-
ent changes in the open source code is of course easier to judge since the
criterion is whether the program works better after such changes. In the
kind of networked Wittgenstein research that McEwen envisions, however,
it is more difficult to say what the criteria for the inclusion of material
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should be. It seems clear that some sort of peer review procedure will have
to be developed. McEwen concedes that although “digital indexing will
allow individual researchers to create their own desktop with their own edi-
tions of texts and their own sets of annotations (just as a chemist is free to set
up her lab in any way she wants)”, there will probably continue to exist a set
of “accepted” texts and annotations, and he notes that it is indeed important
to ask how to decide what to accept into these established networks. 
According to McEwen’s vision this kind of digital indexing could mean
that the traditional differences between the humanities and the natural sci-
ences will become blurred. Possibly, he says, the difference “between the
sciences and the humanities is not that they concern fundamentally different
sorts of objects or involve fundamentally different sorts on inquiry, but that
the latter are simply more difficult to index”. The new possibilities offered
by digital technology may well help to solve this problem. 
Although McEwen’s rapprochement of the humanities and the sciences is
not uncontroversial – and it is possible to argue that it might be too hasty to
condemn traditional forms of humanities research as outdated remnants of
the “print environment” – the kind of networked research procedures
McEwen sketches will in one way or another certainly become crucial in
Wittgenstein research. Indeed, as McEwen points out, Wittgenstein is the
perfect test case in humanities precisely because the “first step” in the estab-
lishment of the kind of platform he envisions has already been taken (i.e. the
digitalization of the corpus of primary texts). So even if one might not agree
with all the details of McEwen’s vision, one can at least accept the conclu-
sion that Wittgenstein scholarship can and should play an exemplary role in
future research in the humanities generally.
All of the writers who comment on the editing of Wittgenstein’s work
thus agree that future publishing and research will crucially involve a digital
element, at least when it comes to the Nachlass. In hindsight, then, it was
perhaps fortunate that the Nachlass was not published as a traditional printed
Gesamtausgabe. Instead, the availability of different forms of digital publica-
tion, based on source transcriptions encoded in a platform-neutral markup
language, combined with access to other related information, might now
open up unforeseen approaches to the appreciation of Wittgenstein’s
dynamic way of thinking and working, approaches that would have been
hampered or restricted by a presentation of the texts in traditional book
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form only. In this sense, Wittgenstein perhaps really does herald a “philoso-
phy of post-literacy”, at least if we think of his Nachlass as a corpus of writ-
ing that is no longer to be understood as a linear text on the misleading
analogy of the “book”. Of course, only the future will show whether this
will indeed mark a radical shift in our understanding of his thought.
This introduction has no pretensions to do full justice to the papers that
ensue, but hopefully it provides an indication of how Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy and works are viewed from a range of interesting and still relevant per-
spectives. Our aim has been to preserve and show the richness, variety and
fertility of approaches currently to be found in Wittgenstein scholarship.
Thus, no attempt has been made to harmonize dissonant voices and con-
flicting views and standpoints. We wish, with the help of our authors, to
contribute to a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its
contexts, through the presentation of fresh and often provocative questions
and approaches, in the hope that readers will feel stimulated to think
through these issues themselves.
